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Civil Disobedience and the Necessity Defense 
JOHN ALAN COHAN∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expression in a free society includes freewheeling public 
dissent on controversial political issues of the day.  Civil disobedience is a 
form of protest that, while usually peaceful, involves violating the law—
usually by trespassing on government property, blocking access to build-
ings, or engaging in disorderly conduct.  Civil disobedience has been 
called “the deliberate violation of law for a vital social purpose.”1  In their 
day in court, civil disobedients have at times sought to interpose the neces-
sity defense to justify their conduct.  The necessity defense asserts that 
breaking the law was justified in order to avert a greater harm that would 
occur as a result of the government policy the offender was protesting. 
Protestors will seek to invoke the necessity defense not so much to 
gain acquittal from the relatively minor charges, but to advance the more 
important objective of publicly airing the moral and political issues that 
inspired their act of civil disobedience.  There is the hope of gaining noto-
riety for a cause by discussing it in court, and “educating” the jury about 
political grievances or other social harms.  The strategy is meant to appeal 
to a higher principle than the law being violated—the necessity of stopping 
objectionable government policies—and to let the jury have an opportunity 
to weigh their technically illegal actions on the scales of justice.  Acquittal 
is of course hoped for in the end but may be quite low on the protestors’ 
list of priorities. 
The necessity defense is attractive to reformers who practice civil 
disobedience because it allows them to deny guilt without re-
nouncing their socially driven acts.  It offers a means to discuss 
political issues in the courtroom, a forum in which reformers can 
demand equal time and, perhaps, respect.  Moreover, its elements 
allow civil disobedients to describe their political motivations.  In 
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 1. HOWARD ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: NINE FALLACIES ON LAW AND ORDER 39 
(1968). 
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proving the imminence of the harm, they can demonstrate the ur-
gency of the social problem.  In showing the relative severity of 
the harms, they can show the seriousness of the social evil they 
seek to avert.  In establishing the lack of reasonable alternatives, 
they can assault the unresponsiveness of those in power in dealing 
with the problem and prod them to action.  And in presenting evi-
dence of a causal relationship, they can argue the importance of 
individual action in reforming society.  Thus, the elements of the 
necessity defense provide an excellent structure for publicizing and 
debating political issues in the judicial forum.2 
The goal of describing their political motivations to the jury, and im-
plicitly to the media, is subject to numerous hurdles inherent in the neces-
sity defense.  In most instances, as we will see, courts will rule as a matter 
of law that the actors have failed in the offer of proof regarding the ele-
ments of the necessity defense so that the jury rarely is given the chance to 
weigh in on the matter.  On the other hand, if the defense is allowed, the 
jury is called upon to weigh controversial political issues and to function as 
the “conscience of the community.”  “Reflected in the jury’s decision is a 
judgment of whether, under all the circumstances of the event and in the 
light of all known about the defendant, the prohibited act, if committed, 
deserves condemnation by the law.”3  In cases where judges have been 
persuaded to allow the necessity defense, juries have, often enough, deliv-
ered not guilty verdicts. 
This article will first examine the nature of civil disobedience, and dis-
tinguish between direct and indirect civil disobedience.  Part II highlights 
some historical examples of civil disobedience.  Part IV then examines the 
principles of the necessity defense, analyzing each of the elements that 
make up the defense, illustrated with cases on point.  Next, Part V will turn 
to an analysis of several abortion-protest cases that raise issues different 
from other types of civil disobedience cases.  Part VI then will examine 
Viet Nam era civil disobedience cases.  Following that, Part VIII will ex-
plore a unique defense known as the Nuremberg Principles defense. 
  
 2. Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, The State Made Me Do It: The Applicability of the 
Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1987). 
 3. Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 985–86 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting). 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
A. Definition of Civil Disobedience 
John Rawls defines civil disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, consci-
entious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bring-
ing about a change in the law or policies of the government.”4  A more 
comprehensive definition of civil disobedience is: 
Civil disobedience is an act of protest, deliberately unlawful, con-
scientiously and publicly performed.  It may have as its object the 
laws or policies of some governmental body, or those of some pri-
vate corporate body whose decisions have serious public conse-
quences; but in either case the disobedient protest is almost in-
variably nonviolent in character.5 
Broadly construed, civil disobedience may be directed toward a law or 
policy of the government, or toward a corporate entity whose policy is the 
subject of protest.  Civil disobedients hope that their conduct makes a dra-
matic appeal to the conscience of the community, affects public awareness 
of a particular social issue, and motivates citizens to demand change in 
certain policies. 
Civil disobedience is a singular hallmark of a free country: 
We must recognize that civil disobedience in various forms, used 
without violent acts against others, is engrained in our society and 
the moral correctness of political protestors’ views has on occasion 
served to change and better our society.  Civil disobedience has 
been prevalent throughout this nation’s history extending from the 
Boston Tea Party and the signing of the Declaration of Independ-
ence, to the freeing of the slaves by operation of the Underground 
Railroad in the mid-1880’s.  More recently, disobedience of “Jim 
Crow” laws served, among other things, as a catalyst to end segre-
gation by law in this country, and violation of selective service 
laws contributed to our eventual withdrawal from the Viet Nam 
War.6 
  
 4. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 364 (1971). 
 5. CARL COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW 39–40 (1971) (em-
phasis omitted); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (5th ed. 1979) (defining civil disobedience as “a 
form of lawbreaking employed to demonstrate the injustice or unfairness of a particular law and in-
dulged in deliberately to focus attention on the allegedly undesirable law”). 
 6. United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 601 (8th Cir. 1986) (Bright, J., dissenting). 
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Civil disobedience differs from other forms of peaceful protest in that 
there is a technical violation of the law such as trespass, blocking of public 
access, or disorderly conduct; and the violation is part of the effort to gar-
ner public attention to the cause.  Ordinary forms of peaceful protest may 
simply involve peaceful picketing, circulating petitions, forming of rallies, 
and the like, in which proper police permits are obtained and there are no 
violations of the law. 
B. Distinction Between Direct and Indirect Civil Disobedience 
There are two kinds of civil disobedience—direct and indirect.  Direct 
civil disobedience involves the intentional violation of a specific law that, 
in and of itself, is challenged as unjust.  An example would be smoking 
marijuana in public to protest a law that makes it unlawful to engage in 
such an act.  Rosa Parks’ famous refusal to move from her seat on a Mont-
gomery, Alabama bus was an act of direct civil disobedience because she 
violated the actual segregation ordinance then in place. 
Indirect civil disobedience, which is undoubtedly the most frequent 
form of protest, involves the violation of a law which is not itself the object 
of protest.  Indirect civil disobedience seeks to mobilize public opinion, 
typically through symbolic action.  For example, the Freedom Riders pro-
tested segregation by riding buses, but authorities arrested them for tres-
pass.  Since they did not directly attack the bus law, they were character-
ized as engaging in indirect civil disobedience.7  While a person might 
trespass and block access of shipments to a nuclear power plant, the act is 
not committed to protest the trespass law under which the defendants are 
charged, but to protest the use of nuclear power.  Or, to cite another exam-
ple, students in France recently engaged in acts of violence and disorderly 
conduct to protest a law that allows employers to dismiss workers under 
the age of twenty-six without cause during their first two years on the job.8  
The protestors do not contest the validity of the disorderly conduct laws, 
but believe their acts are necessary as a means to pressure officials to 
change the law. 
Indirect civil disobedience might also target an unjust policy of a busi-
ness organization, scientific laboratory, government facility, military con-
tractor, or other entity.  While trespass is the most frequent law that is vio-
lated, protestors commit other acts such as malicious mischief, obstruction 
of passage, assault, arson, or theft as a means of protesting an entirely 
  
 7. See Bernard D. Lambek, Necessity and International Law: Arguments for the Legality of Civil 
Disobedience, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 472, 475 (1986). 
 8. See Elaine Sciolino, French Protests over Youth Labor Law Spread to 150 Cities and Towns, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, § 1, at 16. 
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separate issue or policy.  Protests in modern times are often directed to-
ward such issues as nuclear power, war, human rights violations, animal 
cruelty, and environmental pollution. 
The distinction between direct and indirect civil disobedience is impor-
tant because significant case law holds that the necessity defense is avail-
able only to defendants charged with direct civil disobedience.  The lead-
ing case on this point is United States v. Schoon,9 in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the necessity defense, with respect to civil disobedience, is 
available only for direct, not indirect, civil disobedience.  We will discuss 
the Schoon case in Part IV. 
It may be difficult to make a clear distinction between direct and indi-
rect civil disobedience.10  One person may engage in civil disobedience by 
refusing to be drafted because of objections to the draft law, while another 
person may refuse to be drafted because of objections to an unjust war, 
with the former, not the latter, being direct civil disobedience.11 
When people seek to prevent military action by trying to disarm 
weapons, are they engaged in indirect or direct civil disobedience?  
When people block a road to stop trucks from coming in to cut 
down virgin timber, is that indirect civil disobedience because it is 
a violation of a neutral traffic law or is it direct civil disobedience 
because it seeks to actually stop the challenged action?  The dis-
tinction does not work well for the now historically-approved ac-
tions of those who protested against segregation: people like Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., who famously spent time in 1963 in a Bir-
mingham jail for engaging in an illegal march against segregation.  
Was he directly protesting the necessity of a permit, or was he try-
ing to stop segregation?  Under a rigid distinction, he was engaged 
in indirect civil disobedience and thus would not have been able to 
raise the defense of necessity.12 
Some of the most important advancements in civil rights have been a 
product of direct civil disobedience.  In the 1960s there were a great many 
instances of direct civil rights protest, with direct violations of segregation 
  
 9. 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 10. William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases: Bring in the Jury, 38 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 3, 18 (2003).  For example, when Rosa Parks refused to move from her seat on the 
Montgomery, Alabama bus, this was direct civil disobedience because she violated an ordinance that 
required segregation on buses.  In contrast, the Freedom Riders protested segregation by riding buses, 
but police arrested them for trespass.  As such, the group did not directly attack the bus law and thus 
were deemed to have engaged in indirect civil disobedience.  Yet in both cases, the actions were similar 
and targeted the same unjust law.  See id. at 47. 
 11. Id. at 18. 
 12. Id. 
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and discrimination laws.  For example, in Lombard v. State,13 the U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed the convictions of four students who staged a sit-in 
demonstration at a whites-only lunch counter in New Orleans, to protest 
that city’s custom of refusing to allow segregated service in restaurants.  In 
Hamm v. Rock Hill,14 the Court vacated charges against defendants con-
victed of state trespass statutes for participating in sit-ins at lunch counters 
that had a policy of refusing service to blacks.  These protests involved 
direct civil disobedience in that the actors specifically targeted the policies 
at these eating establishments, although the defendants were charged with 
trespass, not with violating the policies in question.  Additionally, there 
were innumerable instances of indirect civil disobedience involving sit-ins, 
which resulted in over 3000 prosecutions for criminal trespass and similar 
violations.  These violations culminated in the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which set an end to discriminatory practices in public 
accommodations.15 
C. Historic Instances of Civil Disobedience 
Of course, civil disobedience is something of a democratic tradition.  
In numerous countries the government allows no public display of dis-
pleasure with government policies.  For example, demonstrators in Arab 
republics have been known to be sentenced to public lashings and prison 
terms for taking part in demonstrations against the government.16  In Arab 
countries, a sentence of flogging is seen as “an ultimate humiliation and 
carries connotations of heresy.”17  Additionally, political protests in China 
are dealt with by arresting the offenders and keeping them incarcerated for 
extended periods of time.18 
As early as 1635, American colonists were persecuted for direct civil 
disobedience in refusing to obey certain laws by reason of conscience.19  
  
 13. 373 U.S. 267 (1963). 
 14. 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
 15. See Quigley, supra note 10, at 24; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241 (1964) (prior to 1971 amendment). 
 16. See Hassan M. Fattah, Saudi Court Orders Lashings for Fifteen Demonstrators, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 13, 2005, at A6. 
 17. See id.; see also Neil MacFarquhar, Asterisk Aside, Saudis Prepare for Their First National 
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A1. 
 18. See Christopher Buckley, U.S. Cautious as China Offers Details on Political Prisoners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at A13. 
 19. Quigley, supra note 10, at 21; see, e.g., POWER OF THE PEOPLE: ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 15 (Robert Cooney & Helen Michalowski eds., 1977).  In 1635, the General Court of 
Massachusetts banished Roger Williams for criticizing the Puritan clergy’s persecution of people of 
conscience and for insisting that the land still belonged to Native Americans.  See id.  Anne Hutchinson 
was banished in 1638 for publicly insisting that conscience was a higher authority than law.  See id. at 
15–16.  The Society of Friends, a pacifist group, was banned from Massachusetts from 1654 to 1661; a 
 
File: Cohan - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on: 8/20/2007 2:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/5/2007 9:58:00 AM 
2007 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE NECESSITY DEFENSE 117 
 
Acts of direct civil disobedience to the English crown were the hallmark of 
the American Revolution, including the Boston Tea Party.20  Opposition to 
slavery involved numerous kinds of direct civil disobedience, including 
aiding and abetting runaway slaves.21  In 1846, Henry David Thoreau 
wrote his famous and influential essay, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, 
in which he gave a cogent argument on the necessity of direct civil disobe-
dience: 
Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall 
we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have suc-
ceeded, or shall we transgress them at once? 
. . . . 
. . . If the injustice [of the machine of government] has a 
spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then 
perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse 
than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be 
the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law.  Let 
your life be a counter friction to stop the machine.22 
Direct civil disobedience was in play in 1872 when Susan B. Anthony 
was indicted and convicted for violating a federal law that prohibited vot-
ing in congressional elections without having a lawful right to vote.23  She 
managed to persuade a voting registrar to register her in violation of a state 
law that restricted voting rights to men and voted for a congressional elec-
tion in New York State.  Ms. Anthony fully conceded the facts alleged in 
the indictment, and the court directed the jury to find a verdict of guilty 
because the facts constituting guilt were undisputed.24 
Before the judge pronounced sentence of a $100 fine, it was reported 
that Ms. Anthony 
had a great many things to say, and declared that in her trial every 
principle of justice had been violated; that every right had been de-
nied; that she had had no trial by her peers; that the Court and the 
jurors were her political superiors and not her peers, and an-
  
law in 1657 imposed a fine of 100 pounds on anyone who brought a Quaker into the territory.  See id.  
In 1658, a Quaker named Richard Keene was fined and beaten for refusing to be trained as a soldier.  
See id. at 18.   
 20. Quigley, supra note 10, at 21. 
 21. Id. 
 22. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 231 (Owen Thomas ed., W.W. 
Norton 1966) (1854). 
 23. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873). 
 24. See id. at 832. 
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nounced her determination to continue her labors until equality 
was obtained, and was proceeding to discuss the question involved 
in the case, when she was interrupted by the Court with the remark 
that these questions could not be reviewed.25 
Following the conviction of Ms. Anthony, indirect civil disobedience 
quickly emerged as the mode of choice in the women’s suffrage move-
ment, with the fight for women’s rights characterized by “direct action, 
civil disobedience, public disruptions, and passive resistance.”26  In 1913, 
over 5000 women marched in Washington on the eve of the inauguration 
of Woodrow Wilson.27  In May of 1917, police arrested over 200 women 
for obstructing the sidewalk in front of the White House.28  Congress later 
passed the suffrage amendment in early 1918, and it was ratified by the 
states on August 26, 1920.29 
In more recent times we have seen many instances of indirect civil dis-
obedience in the areas of nuclear disarmament,30 nuclear power,31 envi-
ronmental pollution,32 and anti-abortion advocacy.33 
Sometimes civil disobedience will involve private rather than public 
acts, such as conscientious resistance to an unjust law in an effort to avert 
the evil effects of the law.  An example would be secretly smuggling im-
migrants across the border for the purpose of securing their safety, rather 
than as a public challenge to immigration policy.  Another example would 
be occupying an abortion clinic for the purpose of physically preventing 
abortions scheduled that day, rather than as an appeal for legal change of 
the law.  Some acts can be hybrid, that is, a combination of a public appeal 
as well as conscientious resistance to the policy in question. 
  
 25. Miss Susan B. Anthony Fined $100 and Costs for Illegal Voting, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1873, at 
4. 
 26. POWER OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 19, at 32, 56–58. 
 27. See Quigley, supra note 10, at 22 n.70. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See generally Robert Aldridge & Virginia Stark, Nuclear War, Citizen Intervention, and the 
Necessity Defense, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299 (1986). 
 31. See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 395 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1978) (involving a mass occupation of the con-
struction site of Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant); Schermbeck v. State, 690 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1985) (involving self-chaining to the door of a utility to protest emission of low-level radiation); State 
v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979) (involving the blocking of an entrance for a nuclear power 
plant). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Scranton, No. 97-30369, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24541 (9th Cir. Sept. 
29, 1998) (involving the blocking of a road in a national forest by staying on top of a tripod structure of 
logs); William W. Cason, Comment, Spiking the Spikers: The Use of Civil RICO Against Environ-
mental Terrorists, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 745 (1995). 
 33. Over fifty cases have considered the necessity defense in connection with abortion protestors.  
See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the necessity defense did 
not apply as a matter of law in prosecution of an abortion protestor). 
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In the 1960s, a period of widespread civil disobedience, both direct and 
indirect, the norm was that one would willingly accept the penalty.  Ad-
dressing the topic of direct civil disobedience, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
said from his Birmingham jail cell: 
One who breaks an unjust law must do so . . . with a willingness to 
accept the penalty.  I submit that an individual who breaks a law 
that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the 
penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the 
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest 
respect for law.34 
The idea is that accepting legal consequences shows that the civil dis-
obedient seeks to better society within the parameters of the social con-
tract, to be persuasive, and to behave ethically.  In the event the protestor is 
convicted, serving time in jail will, according to Dr. King, “arouse the con-
science of the community” over an unjust state of affairs.35 
Accepting the consequences is something that judges today sometimes 
emphasize: 
One characteristic of civil disobedience is the recognition by its 
practitioner that he must face the legal consequences of his of-
fense.  Indeed, it is the appearance of martyrdom for a just cause 
which focuses public attention upon the disobedient crusader 
thereby hastening the achievement of his goal.36 
However, in today’s era of special interest groups seeking to persuade pub-
lic opinion, civil disobedients inevitably seek acquittal of the charges 
rather than willingly accepting the legal consequences for their acts.  By 
invoking the necessity defense, they hope to garner public awareness and 
sympathy for their cause.  If the judge allows the jury to consider the ne-
cessity defense, this will often entail the introduction of expert testimony 
on the imminent danger that the protestors sought to avert, and significant 
media attention is likely to be given the case. 
  
 34. Martin L. King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. 187, 194 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998).   
 35. See id. 
 36. See State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
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III.  JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO ALLOW THE NECESSITY DEFENSE IN CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE CASES 
It is a firmly engrained legal principle that judges decide questions of 
law, and juries decide questions of fact.37  The question of whether the 
proffered evidence is sufficient to constitute the defense of necessity is first 
determined by the judge.  The trial court’s authority to decide whether the 
question should be submitted to the jury is sometimes mandated by statute.  
For example, New York’s necessity statute states: “Whenever evidence 
relating to the defense of justification under this subdivision is offered by 
the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed 
facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense.”38 
The judge’s role has been described as follows: 
As with any offer of proof, it is essential that the offer meet a 
minimum standard as to each element of the defense so that if a 
jury finds it to be true, it would support the affirmative defense.  
Where the offer is insufficient to establish any one element of the 
defense, the trial court may deny use of the defense and prohibit 
evidence as to the other elements of the defense.39 
Thus, the judge will allow an offer of proof from which it may be deter-
mined, as a preliminary matter, whether the defendant has sufficient evi-
dence to make out a valid necessity defense.40 
In making this threshold determination, the judge has the power to take 
a significant issue away from the jury.  In effect, the judge decides whether 
the defendant’s choice of action, in connection with what is claimed to be 
the lesser evil, conflicts with a higher value.  The judge decides if the de-
fendant has produced sufficient evidence in raising the defense, and in par-
ticular decides whether the defendant’s belief in the necessitous circum-
stances was reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of law.41  The judge 
may decide that the defendant’s value choice was wrongheaded and refuse 
to allow the matter to go before the jury.  Yet the value choice is ultimately 
a question of fact that would be decided by the jury if it were allowed to 
hear the defense.  This raises the prospect of unfairness—where disagree-
  
 37. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). 
 38. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2004).  
 39. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 1985). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 952 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); W. PAGE KEETON, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37, at 237 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that a defendant’s 
conduct may be reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of law). 
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ment may exist on the extent to which a value is relative or absolute—
where the value question is unclear. 
In some jurisdictions the courts will allow the defense of necessity to 
be charged to the jury even if there is simply “some” evidence, however 
weak, that raises the elements of the necessity defense, regardless of what 
the trial judge thinks about the credibility of the defense.42 
Generally, there is judicial anxiety about allowing the jury to hear evi-
dence of the necessity defense.  For example, in People v. Weber,43 the 
court stated: 
To accept the defense of necessity under the facts at bench would 
mean that markets may be pillaged because there are hungry peo-
ple; hospitals may be plundered for drugs because there are those 
in pain; homes may be broken into because there are unfortunately 
some without shelter; department stores may be burglarized for 
guns because there is fear of crime; banks may be robbed because 
of unemployment.44 
The concern is that widespread use of the necessity defense could lead 
to lawlessness and that evidence of the necessity defense allows juries to 
decide ambiguous issues of moral culpability and to “nullify” the applica-
tion of criminal laws.  Necessity has the potential to validate decisions 
according to sympathy, conscience, or prejudice rather than according to 
law. 
Of course, this ignores the fact that simply allowing the presentation of 
testimony and other evidence in support of the necessity defense does not 
assure acquittal.  However, when judges have allowed the necessity de-
fense to go to a jury in civil disobedience cases, more often than not the 
defendants are acquitted.45  There are a number of cases in which charges 
were dropped after the judge announced that the necessity defense would 
be permitted.46  Thus, it comes as no surprise that judges unsympathetic to 
the protestors’ cause will tend to exercise discretion by excluding the evi-
dence from the jury.  “Judges do not want to allow juries to make impor-
tant decisions in these cases.  Judges are ruling that order trumps all else 
and refuse to allow juries to hear any of the evidence.”47 
  
 42. See, e.g., Brazelton v. State, 947 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App. 1997). 
 43. 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1984). 
 44. Id. at 5. 
 45. When the necessity defense is actually submitted to the trier of fact in civil disobedience cases, 
defendants have usually been acquitted.  See Lambek, supra note 7, at 473.  
 46. People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
 47. Quigley, supra note 10, at 54. 
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In effect, when a jury is permitted to entertain the necessity defense in 
a civil disobedience case, they are deliberating on policy issues.  The jury 
decides whether the facts alleged by the defendant were as extreme as the 
defendant claims and, if so, whether the defendant made the correct choice 
based on prevailing community standards.  “What these cases are really 
about is gaining notoriety for a cause—the defense allows protestors to get 
their political grievances discussed in a courtroom.”48 
The role of the jury in these cases has been criticized: 
For a jury to endorse illegal acts on the basis of political necessity 
undermines majority rule, implicates the separation of powers doc-
trine, and disrupts principles of equal justice.  Testimony and in-
structions on political necessity promote jury nullification by pro-
viding the jury with a handy framework to negate duly enacted 
laws.  Just as arguments for jury nullification are excluded from 
the courtroom, so the necessity defense might be excluded in civil 
disobedience cases.49 
Courts that are reluctant to entertain the necessity defense in civil dis-
obedience cases have expressed the fear that courts would “tread into areas 
constitutionally committed to other branches of government.”50  The de-
fense would risk distortion of “the role of the [j]udiciary in its relationship 
to the [e]xecutive and the [l]egislature and open the [j]udiciary to an argu-
able charge of providing ‘government by injunction.’”51  The concern is 
that the necessity defense violates the principle of majority rule because 
the jury is asked to decide whether actors were justified in seeking to avert 
an unwise policy.  In effect, this turns the jury into a quasi-legislative or 
executive body that can in effect veto duly promulgated policies.  At the 
same time, juries are not accountable to the electorate as are the legislative 
and executive branches, and they never have to justify the decisions they 
make during jury service.  When a jury acquits a defendant based on the 
necessity defense in such cases, this in effect compromises democratic 
decision-making processes, and allows the minority to frustrate majority 
will. 
Another, more practical, concern is whether juries are suited to make 
fair and accurate policy decisions in the context of political questions, in-
asmuch as their function is to determine facts, not to formulate policy.  In 
addition, jurors in civil disobedience cases will invariably be presented 
with expert witnesses whose testimony will be couched in a way that puts 
  
 48. United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 49. Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 2, at 1195 (footnotes omitted). 
 50. Schoon, 971 F.2d at 199. 
 51. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974). 
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the necessity of the defendants’ actions in the most favorable light.  On the 
other hand, these experts are subject to cross-examination by the prosecu-
tion. 
IV.  ELEMENTS OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE 
The doctrine of necessity, with its inevitable weighing of choices of 
evil, holds that certain conduct, though it violates the law and produces 
harm, is justified because it averts a greater evil and hence produces a net 
social gain or benefit to society.52  Glanville Williams expressed the neces-
sity doctrine this way: “[S]ome acts that would otherwise be wrong are 
rendered rightful by a good purpose, or by the necessity of choosing the 
lesser of two evils.”53  He offers this example: 
Suppose that a dike threatens to give way, and the actor is faced 
with the choice of either making a breach in the dike, which he 
knows will result in one or two people being drowned, or doing 
nothing, in which case he knows that the dike will burst at another 
point involving a whole town in sudden destruction.  In such a 
situation, where there is an unhappy choice between the destruc-
tion of one life and the destruction of many, utilitarian philosophy 
would certainly justify the actor in preferring the lesser evil.54 
The utilitarian idea is that certain illegal conduct ought not be punished 
because, due to the special circumstances of the situation, a net benefit to 
society has resulted.  This utilitarian rationale is sometimes criticized as 
“ends-justifying-the-means” in that the doctrine allows, within certain lim-
its, that it is justifiable to break the letter of the law if doing so will pro-
duce a net benefit to society.55 
Another commentator has observed: “[T]hese [justified] acts are ones, 
as regards which, upon balancing all considerations of public policy, it 
  
 52. See Joseph J. Simeone, “Survivors” of the Eternal Sea: A Short True Story, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1123, 1141 (2001). 
 53. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198 (1957). 
 54. Id. at 199–200. 
 55. Justice Brandeis stated: 
In a government of laws, existence of the government would be imperiled if it fails to ob-
serve the law scrupulously. . . . Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy.  To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies 
the means—to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the con-
viction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.  Against that pernicious doc-
trine this court should resolutely set its face. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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seems desirable that they should be encouraged and commended even 
though in each case some individual may be injured or the result may be 
otherwise not wholly to be desired.”56 
The idea, in its simplest form, is that it is unjust to penalize someone 
for violating the law when the action produces a greater good or averts a 
greater evil.  Had the unlawful action not taken place, society would have 
endured a greater evil than that which resulted from violating the law. 
English and American courts have long recognized the defense of ne-
cessity, even in the absence of statutory law on the subject.57  Today many 
states have codified the necessity defense in one form or another.58 
With the necessity defense there will always be a prima facie violation 
of the law.  For our purposes, the violation will usually be trespass, disor-
derly conduct, or obstruction of access laws. 
In our discussion we will apply a comprehensive five-prong test that 
must be met in order for someone to invoke the defense.  The defendant 
must prove: 
(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser 
evil; (2) that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he rea-
sonably anticipated a causal relation between his conduct and the 
harm to be avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal alterna-
tives to violating the law.59 
The fifth factor is that “the [l]egislature has not acted to preclude the de-
fense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue.”60  
Courts generally require that all the factors be proven in order for the de-
fendant to succeed in the necessity defense.  In our discussion of civil dis-
obedience we will refer to these factors as follows: (1) the choice of evils 
factor, (2) the imminence factor, (3) the causal nexus factor, (4) the legal 
way out factor, and (5) the preemption factor. 
  
 56. JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 189 (1934). 
 57. See Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The 
Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 289, 291–96 (1974). 
 58. See, e.g., ALASKA. STAT. § 11.81.320 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 (West 2006); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
703-302 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (West 
2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2004); TEX. 
PENAL CODE § 9.22 (Vernon 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West 2003). 
 59. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 60. Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); see also State v. 
Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting same language).  A sixth factor is usually 
required in the necessity defense—that the defendant not be negligent or reckless in bringing about the 
necessitous circumstances in the first instance.  See, e.g., United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (“[D]efendant [must show that he] has [not] recklessly or negligently placed himself in a 
situation in which it was probable that he would be [forced to choose the criminal conduct].”).  This 
sixth factor, however, is not relevant in civil disobedience cases. 
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A further consideration is what standard will apply in assessing the ex-
istence of a given factor.  Courts will instruct the jury to scrutinize the facts 
based on the balance of human reason in light of all the relevant circum-
stances.  The defendant must entertain a reasonable belief in the necessity 
of his conduct.  The reasonableness standard ensures that a jury, in evaluat-
ing the defendant’s action, shares the actor’s evaluation of the necessitous 
circumstances.  This standard has been expressed as follows: 
While an accused’s perceptions of the surrounding facts may be 
highly relevant in determining whether his conduct should be ex-
cused, those perceptions remain relevant only so long as they are 
reasonable.  The accused person must, at the time of the act, hon-
estly believe, on reasonable grounds, that he faces a situation of 
imminent peril that leaves no reasonable legal alternative open.  
There must be a reasonable basis for the accused’s beliefs and ac-
tions, but it would be proper to take into account circumstances 
that legitimately affect the accused person’s ability to evaluate his 
situation.  The test cannot be a subjective one, and the accused 
who argues that he perceived imminent peril without an alternative 
would only succeed with the defence [sic] of necessity if his belief 
was reasonable given his circumstances and attributes.61 
Under this standard, it is not sufficient for a protestor to subjectively 
believe that his action “was necessary to prevent a greater evil.”62  Under 
the reasonableness standard, an actor must reasonably construe that there is 
an actual, imminent threat in the first place, and in making a choice of 
evils, that one evil was greater than the other.  The threat need not be an 
actual threat, provided the actor has a well founded belief that impending 
harm will result unless he takes steps to avert it.63  The balancing of evils 
  
 61. Latimer v. The Queen, [2001] S.C.R. 3, 33 (emphasis added). 
 62. See Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 481, 
518 (2002).  In People v. McDaniel, 661 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), the defendant and 
several others entered a gay congregation and loudly interrupted the liturgy in an effort to protest what 
they “anticipated would be a service honoring gay pride.”  Id. at 905.  The defendant was charged and 
convicted of attempted aggravated disorderly conduct.  The defendant sought to interpose the necessity 
defense.  She described the harm sought to be avoided as the “sacrilege” inherent in the anticipated 
content of the religious service.  The court held that this did not constitute an “imminent public or 
private injury” within the meaning of New York’s necessity statute.  Id. at 906.  “Simply put, the de-
fendant’s moral convictions did not justify her criminal behavior.”  Id. 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (opinion of Story, J.).  
This involved a group of sailors charged with mutiny.  The defendants sought to justify mutiny on the 
grounds that their ship was not seaworthy.  The court instructed the jury “that the defendants ought not 
to be found guilty, if they acted bona fide upon reasonable grounds of belief, that the ship was unsea-
worthy.”  Id. at 874.  The court said that if in fact the crew was mistaken as to the unseaworthiness of 
the ship, the jury could determine whether, nonetheless, the crew was reasonable in holding its belief 
and in taking action in accordance with that reasonable belief.  Id.  The jury could acquit if it found that 
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“cannot, of course, be committed to the private judgment of the actor, but 
must, in most cases, be determined at trial with due regard being given for 
the crime charged and the higher value sought to be achieved.”64  As one 
commentator has observed, “[n]ecessity does not excuse a person merely 
because he thought his conduct served a higher value; his opinion must be 
ratified by the court of trial.”65 
Let us now examine each element of the necessity defense in the con-
text of civil disobedience cases. 
A. The Choice of Evils Factor 
The choice of evils factor is rarely in dispute.  For instance, no one se-
riously disputes that criminal trespass or unlawful entry is a lesser evil than 
the evils of a nuclear disaster.66  It is usually an easy task for a defendant to 
show that the harm sought to be averted (e.g., environmental pollution) 
was greater than the relatively minor criminal charges (e.g., trespass) now 
before the court.  “It is, of course, impossible to argue that nuclear war is 
not a more serious harm than a peaceful, if unlawful, anti-nuclear prayer 
demonstration . . . .”67 
State v. Diener68 involved the arrest of the defendant and ten others at 
the corporate offices of the General Dynamics Corporation.  The defendant 
was part of a large demonstration to protest the company’s production of 
Trident nuclear submarines.69  The defendant had attempted on several 
occasions to arrange a meeting with company executives, who refused.  On 
the day of the incident the defendant and others positioned themselves in 
the lobby of the company in hopes of pressuring executives into meeting 
with them.70  Instead, they were arrested and charged with criminal tres-
pass.71 
At trial the defendant sought to argue that the United States’ continued 
production and deployment of nuclear weapons was illegal under interna-
tional law, and that he and the others in his group were justified in believ-
ing that their remaining on General Dynamics’ property was necessary to 
avert a potential nuclear disaster.72  The court acknowledged that the 
  
the crew, “having acted upon their best judgment fairly, and in a case where respectable, intelligent, 
and impartial witnesses should assert, that they should have done the same.”  Id. 
 64. State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Vt. 1979). 
 65. Glanville Williams, Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 128, 134 (1978). 
 66. See Lambek, supra note 7, at 477. 
 67. United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 68. 706 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 583–84. 
 71. Id. at 584. 
 72. Id. at 585. 
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choice of evils element is unchallengeable, “that on balance his trespass 
was trivial in the face of a possible nuclear disaster.  However, this fact 
alone is insufficient to invoke the defense of justification.”73 
In People v. Gray,74 six protestors were acquitted of disorderly conduct 
in a non-jury trial, based on the necessity defense.  The defendants were all 
members of an organization called Transportation Alternatives, which is 
devoted to the promotion of non-vehicular, ecologically sound means of 
transportation.  The protestors had blocked traffic in New York City to 
protest the opening of a bike and pedestrian lane to vehicular traffic.  The 
judge issued a forty-two page decision that reviewed dozens of decisions 
involving the necessity defense and set forth an excellent judicial overview 
of the doctrine.75 
On the choice of evils factor, the court noted that the harm perceived 
by the defendants was the “asphyxiation of New York” by automobile-
related pollution.76  The harm they sought to combat was the release of 
higher levels of pollution from vehicular traffic and the unnecessary death 
and serious illness of many New Yorkers as a result.77  The court said that 
these harms could not be said to have developed through any fault of the 
defendants.78  The court noted that the defendants were not asserting the 
necessity defense with respect to actions taken to mitigate a fundamental 
right of others articulated by courts (such as in abortion protests, which 
have asserted a necessity defense).79  Indeed, there is no fundamental right 
to contribute to life threatening air pollution.  The court concluded that the 
death and illness of New Yorkers as a result of air pollution and the danger 
to cyclists and pedestrians posed by vehicles are far greater harms than that 
created by the violation of disorderly conduct.80 
B. The Imminence of Harm Factor 
A significant hurdle with the necessity defense in civil disobedience 
cases is the requirement that the evil which is sought to be avoided be im-
minent.  Courts will tend to find that the danger perceived by the civil dis-
obedients was not in fact imminent, and therefore there was ample time in 
which to pursue reasonable legal alternatives. 
  
 73. Id. 
 74. 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
 75. See generally id.  
 76. Id. at 857. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
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The majority of cases on this point have held that the harms which the 
protesters sought to avoid were too speculative or uncertain to support the 
defense.  These courts have embraced the view of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Mitchell v. Harmony,81 that “rumors and suspicions” of a “secret design” 
must have an evidentiary foundation and that the threat must be “immedi-
ate and impending, and not remote or contingent” to support the necessity 
defense.82  Imminence of harm connotes a real emergency, a crisis involv-
ing immediate danger to oneself or to a third party.83  In considering the 
imminence factor the courts need not accept “bald assertions, unsupport-
able conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like.”84 
From the defense standpoint, the hurdle is to convince the judge that 
proffered evidence in the form of expert testimony will show that under 
certain situations there could well be a truly imminent danger of the 
harm—due to a nuclear accident, for example. 
In State v. Diener,85 mentioned above, the court said that the immi-
nence requirement was lacking in that the occurrence of a nuclear catastro-
phe remains speculative.86  Similarly in United States v. Maxwell,87 it was 
held that the presence of thermo-nuclear submarine weapons was not in 
and of itself evidence of imminent harm.  In United States v. May,88 it was 
held that the existence of a Trident missile system failed to satisfy the im-
minence of harm factor.  Also, in another case involving nuclear power 
protest, State v. Dorsey,89 it was held that the necessity defense is limited 
to acts directed to the prevention of harm that is reasonably certain to oc-
cur.  The defense is not available where the harm is non-imminent or de-
batable.90 
In Commonwealth v. Brugmann,91 the court, in ruling that the immi-
nence factor was lacking in a case against protestors for trespassing at a 
nuclear power plant, noted that the “low level radiation, nuclear waste, and 
  
 81. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851). 
 82. Id. at 133; see also State v. Greene, 623 P.2d 933, 937 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (harm must be 
“reasonably certain to occur”); Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1982) (defendant must have “faced . . . a clear and imminent danger, not one which is debatable or 
speculative”); Commonwealth v. Averill, 423 N.E.2d 6, 8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (necessity only avail-
able if defendant faced an “obvious and generally recognized harm[]”); Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 
498 A.2d 806, 809 (Pa. 1985) (harm must be “readily apparent and recognizable to reasonable per-
sons”). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 84. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 85. 706 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 86. Id. at 585. 
 87. 254 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 88. 622 F.2d 1000, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 89. 395 A.2d 855, 857 (N.H. 1978). 
 90. Id. at 857. 
 91. 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
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the possibility of a nuclear accident” that the protestors cited in support of 
their necessity defense, have been regarded as “long term” hazards.92 
In State v. Warshow,93 which was precedent cited in Brugmann, the de-
fendants were convicted of unlawful trespass in protesting at the main gate 
of a nuclear power plant known as Vermont Yankee.94  The defendants 
argued that the specter of a nuclear accident satisfied the imminence of 
harm requirement of the necessity defense.  The defendants expressed a 
sincere belief that the proliferation of nuclear power presented real and 
substantial dangers, and that they chose the course which would result in 
the least harm to the public, even though it meant violating the criminal 
law.95  However, the judge excluded the proffered evidence relating to the 
hazards of nuclear power plant operations, and refused a jury instruction on 
the issue of necessity.96 
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and said that the 
defendants failed to show that the nuclear power plant posed an imminent 
emergency.  The court said that the “chance” or “possibility” of a nuclear 
accident was “too speculative and uncertain” as to constitute an imminent 
danger.97  The danger perceived by the defendants was speculative, not 
actual.  The court said: “[L]ow-level radiation and nuclear waste are not 
the types of imminent danger classified as an emergency sufficient to jus-
tify” the necessity defense.98  The court noted that the hazards posed long-
range risks, not an imminent threat, and hence the protestors had time to 
exercise reasonable legal alternatives in furtherance of their goals.99 
In State v. Dansinger,100 several defendants were found guilty of crimi-
nal trespass upon Maine Air National Guard property in Bangor, Maine.  
They were protesting the nuclear arms race.  They argued that their actions 
were necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to themselves and others.  
The court held that the competing harms justification was inapplicable 
because the threat cited was not imminent.  The court said that the word 
“imminent” in Maine’s necessity statute means “appearing as if about to 
happen; likely to happen without delay; impending . . . .”101  The threat of 
nuclear war cited by the defendants was not an “imminent” threat of physi-
cal harm as required by the statute, and there was no reason to believe that 
  
 92. Id. (quoting State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Vt. 1979)). 
 93. 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979). 
 94. Id. at 1001. 
 95. Id. at 1003. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1002. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Warshow, 410 A.2d at 1002. 
 100. 521 A.2d 685 (Me. 1987). 
 101. Id. at 688 (quoting WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 909 (2d ed. 1979)). 
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defendants’ acts would lessen the threat of nuclear war.  Further, the court 
affirmed the principle that it is not enough that an actor subjectively be-
lieve that an imminent threat of physical harm exists, but “it is further req-
uisite that it be shown as a fact that such physical harm is imminently 
threatened.”102  The court added that the plain language of the necessity 
statute indicated that it was not designed as forming a basis for justifying 
acts of civil disobedience in the first place.103 
Similarly, in People v. Scutari,104 the necessity defense was rejected 
with respect to defendants who entered a congressman’s office in an at-
tempt to speak with him about U.S. foreign policy toward the government 
of El Salvador.  The court held that the trespass was not necessary to avoid 
imminent public or private injury, and that in any event there was no evi-
dence that the congressman’s vote would have had any immediate impact 
on continued funding of the El Salvador government, and the trespass in an 
effort to arrange a meeting with the congressman was not an emergency 
measure that could reasonably have been thought to accomplish the goal of 
changing the foreign policy toward El Salvador.105 
In People v. O’Grady,106 a similar result was reached with respect to 
trespass of a naval facility in order to protect against nuclear weapons.  The 
defendants scaled a fence containing signs warning against trespass and 
entered a naval facility under construction on Staten Island, New York.  
They did so to protest nuclear weapons which they believed would be 
aboard vessels entering the port once the facility was completed.107  The 
court held that the perceived danger, which was the subject of protest, 
lacked the requisite immediacy, and that in any event the action taken, 
namely trespass, could not be deemed reasonably calculated to avoid it.108 
The 1985 case, Commonwealth v. Berrigan,109 is a well-known civil 
disobedience case that dealt with the imminence of harm factor.  It in-
volved a high profile protest against nuclear weapons by a group of disar-
mament activists known as the Plowshares Eight.  They entered a General 
Electric plant, beat missile components with hammers, poured blood on the 
premises, and caused about $28,000 in damages to property.110  They were 
charged and convicted of burglary, criminal mischief, and criminal con-
  
 102. Id. (quoting State v. Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me. 1979) (emphasis added)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 560 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1990). 
 105. Id. at 443–44; see also People v. Craig, 585 N.E.2d 783, 787 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the 
government’s actions in Nicaragua did not constitute an imminent danger). 
 106. 560 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 107. Id. at 603. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985). 
 110. Id. at 228. 
File: Cohan - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on: 8/20/2007 2:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/5/2007 9:58:00 AM 
2007 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE NECESSITY DEFENSE 131 
 
spiracy.  The defendants sought to present evidence from experts to sup-
port their contentions that their actions were necessary to prevent a nuclear 
holocaust.111  The trial court rejected the offer of proof, holding that the 
defendants could not establish that the operation of the General Electric 
facility constituted an imminent danger to the public justifying their tres-
pass and other criminal conduct.  The appellate court reversed the convic-
tion and ordered a new trial.112 
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the appellate 
court’s decision and reinstated the convictions.113  The court construed 
Pennsylvania’s necessity statute, section 510 of the Crimes Code, which 
remains unchanged to this day and reads: 
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure, or destruction of, 
damage to, intrusion on or interference with property is justifiable 
under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege 
in civil action based thereon, unless: 
(1) this title or law defining the offense deals with the specific 
situation involved; or 
(2) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed other-
wise plainly appears.114 
The court noted that the necessity statute extends to actions taken to 
protect oneself, others, and property.115  The court construed the statute 
together with section 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which says 
the law will excuse a trespass onto the land of another “if it is, or if the 
actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an 
imminent public disaster.”116  The court said that this defense is available 
only to 
one who is confronted with a widespread public crisis which does 
not allow the actor to select from among several solutions, some of 
which do not involve criminal acts.  The threatened disaster 
(manmade or act of God) must be real and immediate, not imag-
ined or speculative, and must threaten not only the actor but others 
as well.  The actions taken to avoid the public disaster must sup-
port a reasonable belief or inference that the actions would be ef-
fective in avoiding or alleviating the impending harm.  Addition-
  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 227. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510 (West 1998). 
 115. Berrigan, 501 A.2d at 229. 
 116. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965)). 
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ally, the defense cannot be available in situations where the con-
duct some perceive to engender public disaster has been specifi-
cally approved of by legislation making it legal conduct, or where 
a legislative purpose appears to exclude the defense.117 
Thus, the court construed the necessity statute to apply to the destruction, 
damage, intrusion on, or interference with property only in situations 
where the actor seeks to avert a “widespread public crisis” or a “public 
disaster” that is clear and imminent.118  The court did not provide guidance 
as to what constitutes a “widespread public crisis” or a “public disaster.”  It 
would seem clear that a nuclear holocaust would surely fall within the 
scope of a “widespread public crisis.”  However, on the imminence re-
quirement the court said that the defendants’ offer of proof “as a matter of 
law . . . was insufficient to establish that the harm . . . was a clear and im-
minent public disaster.”119 
A comment to section 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says 
that “[a] reasonable belief on the part of the actor in the necessity of the 
entry for the prevention or mitigation of a public disaster is sufficient to 
justify the entry.”120  The court said that it would require a showing that 
“the actor was faced with a public disaster that was clear and imminent, not 
debatable or speculative,” and that, under the facts of the case, the defen-
dant’s beliefs were reasonable.  The court may have also been influenced 
by the fact that the actions taken by the defendants (e.g., pouring of human 
blood) were causally ineffective in averting the perceived danger. 
In discussing the imminence of harm factor, the court in People v. 
Gray, discussed above, asked whether the defendants had “a well-founded 
belief in imminent grave injury.”121  The court heard testimony from vari-
ous experts on the issue of whether air pollution constitutes a grave and 
imminent harm, and also on the dangerous situation faced by cyclists and 
pedestrians traveling at the same hours as vehicular traffic.  The court 
found that “the resulting mixture of automobiles, bicycles and pedestrians 
represents an extremely dangerous situation with the potential for tragic 
consequences.”122  The court distinguished this situation from other cases 
where the harm was found to be too remote.  The court said: “In this case, 
the threatened harm of increased deaths and illness through air pollution is 
a uniquely modern horror, very different from the fires, floods and famines 
  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 230. 
 120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. d (1965). 
 121. People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
 122. Id. at 858. 
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which triggered necessity situations in simpler days.  However, the poten-
tial injury is just as great, if not greater.”123 
The imminence of harm factor is closely connected to the legal way 
out factor discussed below: if the harm to be avoided is not truly imminent, 
then there is time in which to pursue reasonable legal alternatives in an 
effort to abate the danger. 
One might question the wisdom of requiring a strict construction of the 
imminence factor in civil disobedience cases.  If forced to wait until a nu-
clear accident is truly imminent, neither protestors nor anyone else will 
have the opportunity to take effective action.  “Prior to the Three Mile Is-
land crisis . . . one could not have known that the accident threatened ‘to 
occur immediately.’  There comes a time when citizen intervention is too 
late.”124  In other words, certain hazards are of such potential danger that 
the imminence requirement must be relaxed to accommodate necessity.  
From the standpoint of civil disobedients, it is foolish for people to await 
the final denouement of a nuclear accident, when people may be immersed 
in fallout or gasping for their last breaths and then, only then, find the cir-
cumstances sufficiently advanced as to justify action. 
The Model Penal Code specifically rejects the imminence of harm re-
quirement.125 
C. The Causal Nexus Factor 
One of the greatest difficulties in advancing the necessity defense in 
civil disobedience cases is the need to show that there is a causal efficacy 
between the defendant’s conduct and the evil sought to be averted.  This is 
particularly difficult in cases involving indirect civil disobedience.  Acts of 
trespass, disorderly conduct, or blocking access to facilities will draw at-
tention, through the media, to the injustice that the protestors seek to vindi-
cate, but in and of itself these acts are not likely to abate the evils by effect-
ing a policy reversal.  Courts will tend to find that the actors could not have 
had any reasonable expectation that their action would be effective in 
averting the danger and that their action was in fact ineffective. 
The courts generally make two points in connection with the causal 
nexus factor: one, that the defendants failed to show a reasonable belief in 
a causal link between their conduct and averting the imminent danger; and 
two, that in fact there was no causal efficacy in that the action failed to 
avert the imminent danger. 
  
 123. Id. at 860. 
 124. Lambek, supra note 7, at 484. 
 125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 3, at 16–17 (1962). 
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Some courts have erected a seemingly insurmountable causal relation-
ship standard, holding that defendants cannot claim necessity unless they 
could reasonably have expected their actions to completely eliminate the 
threatened harm.126  Other courts have been more accommodating, holding 
that defendants must prove a reasonable belief that their conduct would be 
in some way effective in alleviating or reducing the risk posed by the 
threatened harm.127  In any event, courts under both the strict and more 
accommodating view have consistently held that the defendants failed to 
show evidence of a causal relationship other than simply by the fervor of 
their convictions.128  These cases suggest that an act of civil disobedience, 
in and of itself, is unlikely to help effect a change in policy. 
To my view, the requirement that a protestor reasonably anticipate a 
direct causal relationship between the conduct and the harm to be averted 
is problematic.  Civil disobedience is different from other situations in 
which the necessity defense is invoked.  In necessity cases outside the con-
text of civil disobedience, causation is seldom an issue, for if the defen-
dant’s action averted or failed to avert the greater evil, this is immediately 
apparent from the facts of the case.129  With civil disobedience, there are 
many examples of causal efficacy in bringing about changes in government 
policy, not immediately, but after a period of time.130  The action of a few 
protestors, in combination with the action of others, may well accelerate a 
political process that will lead ultimately to the policy change sought—
  
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982) (defendants must show 
that a reasonable person would think that defendants’ actions “would terminate the official policy of the 
United States government as to nuclear weapons or nuclear power”); State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095, 
1109 (Haw. 1973) (defendants did not show that their conduct was “reasonably designed to actually 
prevent the threatened greater harm”); Commonwealth v. Averill, 423 N.E.2d 6, 7–8 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1981) (defendants’ conduct “could not extinguish an immediate peril, if there was one”). 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1972) (it was unreasonable for 
defendant to believe that his actions might “have any significant effect upon the supposed ills that he 
hoped to remedy” (footnotes omitted)); State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 688 (Me. 1987) (“there is no 
reason to believe that the Defendants’ acts would lessen the threat of harm”); People v. Hubbard, 320 
N.W.2d 294, 298 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (defendants’ actions “could not reasonably be presumed to 
have any effect in halting the production of nuclear power”); Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 
226, 229 (Pa. 1985) (defendant reasonably must have believed that actions “would be effective in 
avoiding or alleviating the impending harm”); Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 498 A.2d 806, 809 (Pa. 
1985) (defendants’ conduct could have “neither terminated nor reduced the [alleged] danger”). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 736 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that defen-
dants could not reasonably have believed that their entry into a defense plant would bring about nuclear 
disarmament); United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 433–34 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that defendant 
had failed to establish that breaking into an air force base and vandalizing government property could 
reasonably be expected to lead to the termination of the MX missile program); United States v. 
Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (finding it unlikely that splashing blood on 
Pentagon walls would impel the United States to divest itself of nuclear weapons). 
 129. See example offered by Glanville Williams of making a breach in the dike that threatens to give 
way, supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Lambek, supra note 7, at 481. 
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perhaps years down the line.  Our history is replete with examples in which 
legislative change has been prompted by principled and non-violent politi-
cal protest. 
[C]ivil disobedience has often stirred our nation’s collective con-
science and spurred us to change or repeal unjust laws.  Often, ju-
ries refused to convict good men of conscience whose love of jus-
tice had motivated them to violate the law.  On some occasions, a 
jury would convict but the judge in recognition of the righteous-
ness of the underlying cause would suspend sentence or issue a 
nominal find [sic].131 
President Lyndon Johnson noted that the black American was the “real 
hero of this struggle . . . .  His actions and protests, his call to risk safety, 
and even to risk his life, have awakened the conscience of this nation.  His 
demonstrations have been designed to call attention to injustice; designed 
to provoke change; designed to stir reform.”132 
Movements opposing slavery, supporting women’s suffrage, human 
rights, gay rights, environmental protection, and other causes have shown 
that there is causal efficacy between civil disobedience and the policy 
changes sought—but the change may take time and hence the causal con-
nection is not “direct” in the immediate sense.  Who is to say that the 1872 
act of civil disobedience by Susan B. Anthony in illegally registering to 
vote did not result in the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the 
ratification of which was not completed until August 18, 1920?133  Surely 
her action called attention to a significant injustice and was designed to 
provoke change.  The ultimate passage of the Nineteenth Amendment took 
nearly fifty years, and was met with significant resistance by those who 
opposed women’s suffrage, but inevitably there was victory in the move-
ment. 
One commentator on necessity and civil disobedience has noted that 
there is not 
a rigid time/space nexus between the act and the perceived harm. . 
. .  A court may find that an attenuated relationship between the act 
and the harm does not constitute a strict causal nexus.  However, it 
does not follow from this finding that no reasonable juror could 
find that the particular scenario created a reasonable belief in the 
  
 131. Commonwealth v. Markum, 541 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 132. Lambek, supra note 7, at 480–81 (quoting television address by President Lyndon B. Johnson 
(Mar. 15, 1965)). 
 133. The Nineteenth Amendment states: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIX, § 1. 
File: Cohan - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on:  8/20/2007 2:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/5/2007 9:58:00 AM 
136 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 1 
 
efficacy of the act.  The court should not use its power to interpret 
the meaning of the defense narrowly to keep the determination of 
reasonableness from the jury.134 
Indeed, social scientists have considerable difficulty in ascribing causal 
relations between policy interventions and outcomes: 
[S]ocial science has been able to provide only what we would call 
“weak” causal theories.  In the vast majority of cases the effects 
that are found are of modest size and only a small amount of the 
variation in the dependent variable is explained. 
. . . . 
What is problematic is that in arguing for particular policies we 
often argue as if social science’s findings imply that there are 
strong determinative relations between particular causes and out-
comes.  Certainly, education affects earnings, but this does not 
mean that equalizing education will have much effect on earnings 
inequality.  Similarly, economic poverty certainly affects child de-
velopment, but this does not mean that reducing economic poverty 
will substantially improve child development.135 
In ruling against the causal nexus factor, courts often do not articulate 
the standard which they are considering—i.e., whether they are relying on 
a direct causal nexus or a more attenuated relationship between the act and 
the policy change sought by the protestors.  For example, in State v. Dan-
singer,136 the court said that the necessity defense was inapplicable because 
there was no causal relationship between the defendants’ acts and the 
avoidance of threat of harm of nuclear war,137 but failed to specify what 
sort of standard it was invoking.  In United States v. Seward,138 protestors 
were charged with blocking a roadway during an antinuclear protest.  The 
court challenged the defendants to establish that “a reasonable man would 
think that blocking the entry to [the nuclear weapons facility] for one day 
would terminate the official policy of the U.S. government as to nuclear 
weapons or nuclear power,” but failed to specify what standard of causa-
tion the court had in mind. 
  
 134. Laura J. Schulking, Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 103–04 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
 135. Martin Rein & Christopher Winship, The Dangers of “Strong” Causal Reasoning in Social 
Policy, 36 SOC’Y 38, 40–41 (1999). 
 136. 521 A.2d 685 (Me. 1987). 
 137. Id. at 688. 
 138. 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982). 
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In People v. Chachere,139 the court construed New York’s necessity 
statute to require that the defendant must establish that there was a reason-
able certainty that his actions would prevent the perceived harm, and that 
“the final result would be to stop the construction of the [nuclear power] 
plant.”140  The defendant trespassed onto the grounds of a nuclear power 
plant during a public demonstration concerning the plant’s safety.  The 
court said that “symbolic acts” of this sort do not meet the requirements of 
the necessity statute in part because there could not be any reasonable cer-
tainty of success in preventing the construction of the plant.141 
In People v. Gray,142 the defendants testified that in the past they had 
participated in civil disobedience that had produced successful results in 
obtaining bicycle access to a roadway and in preventing a ban of bicycles 
on public streets.  They testified that in the present case they believed their 
actions would have a direct effect in avoiding the perceived harms in this 
case.143  The court said that the standard for the causal relationship factor in 
New York is that the defendant’s actions be “reasonably designed to actu-
ally prevent the threatened greater harm.”144 
The court rejected a rigid interpretation of the causal nexus factor, and 
said that an “after-the-fact requirement of an immediate relationship, con-
stitutes a rule of per se unreasonableness, whereby a defendant who fails is 
held as a matter of law not to have reasonably believed in the efficacy of 
his action.”145  All that the court required was that the defendants offer 
sufficient evidence of a reasonable belief in a causal link between their 
behavior and ending the perceived harm, not that they expected a result 
immediately following their action.146  “In the opinion of this Court, a de-
fendant’s reasonable belief must be in the necessity of his action to avoid 
the injury.  The law does not require certainty of success.”147  The court 
added: “Penalizing them because a result reasonably expected did not actu-
ally occur immediately following their action, would be contrary to the 
purposes of the necessity defense.”148  Thus, the court recognized that the 
causal efficacy with indirect civil disobedience might not be direct and 
apparent, but relatively remote in time, or the results may be somewhat 
subtle, but nonetheless effective. 
  
 139. 428 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1980). 
 140. Id. at 783–84. 
 141. See id. 
 142. 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
 143. Id. at 863. 
 144. Id. at 862 (quoting Chachere, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 781). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 863. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 863. 
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The court departed from precedent of other New York courts in con-
struing the causal nexus factor.  Most New York courts have held that the 
defendant must have a reasonable certainty that the condition acted against 
will be completely stopped or overcome.149  The judge in Gray said: “A 
number of jurisdictions, New York among them, have included . . . [the 
requirement that] the action taken must be reasonably expected to avert the 
impending danger.”150  The court went on to say that it “has interpreted 
some of the elements of this defense in a manner which departs from prior 
decisions in this area.”151 
In some cases the causal nexus factor is rejected based on the finding 
that it was unreasonable to believe that the action could have had any ef-
fect in changing the policy in question.  For example, State v. Diener152 
rejected the notion that the defendant could have had any reasonable ex-
pectation that his act of trespass would be effective in abating the danger.  
At best, it could have resulted in a meeting with General Dynamics execu-
tives.  But “[a]ny expectation that such a meeting would result in the dis-
continuance of the manufacture of nuclear weapon systems is more accu-
rately described as fanciful optimism than reasonable.”153  In United States 
v. Simpson,154 the defendants were precluded from offering the necessity 
defense because “[t]he Vietnamese conflict could obviously have contin-
ued whether or not the San Jose, California draft board was able to restore 
its files and continue its lawful operation.”155  In State v. Marley,156 the 
court found that the defendants could not have expected that their trespass 
at a nuclear arms plant would halt its production of war material.157  In 
Commonwealth v. Berrigan, in considering the causal nexus factor the 
court said that “the actions chosen by Appellees (destruction of the casings 
and pouring of human blood) could not under any hypothesis reasonably 
be expected to be effective in avoiding the perceived public disaster of a 
nuclear holocaust.”158 
  
 149. See, e.g., People v. Yajure, 736 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. App. Term 2001) (The defendant was 
convicted of disorderly conduct and trespassing in connection with his attempt to prevent demolition of 
a historic building.  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the unlawful conduct was neces-
sary to prevent an imminent public or private injury within the meaning of the necessity statute and 
held that the defendant’s conduct was not reasonably calculated to prevent the alleged harm.). 
 150. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 853. 
 151. Id. at 854. 
 152. 706 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 153. Id. at 585. 
 154. 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 155. Id. at 518 n.7. 
 156. 509 P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973). 
 157. Id. at 1109. 
 158. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 230 (Pa. 1985).  Other courts have ruled as a matter 
of law on the ineffectiveness of other similar acts.  See, e.g., United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (spray painting government property to terminate the MX missile program); United States v. 
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A leading case on the necessity defense and civil disobedience, United 
States v. Schoon,159 did in fact specify the standard it was applying in 
evaluating the causal nexus factor.  The defendants were accused of ob-
structing activities of the Internal Revenue Service.  They “gained admit-
tance to the IRS office in Tucson, [Arizona,] where they chanted ‘keep 
America’s tax dollars out of El Salvador,’ splashed simulated blood on the 
counters, walls, and carpeting, and generally obstructed the office’s opera-
tions.”160  The defendants contended that their acts in protest of American 
involvement in El Salvador were necessary to avoid further bloodshed in 
that country.161 
Schoon cited United States v. Aguilar,162 for the principle that the de-
fendants must show that their conduct had “a direct causal relation[]” to 
averting the greater evil.  Few acts of civil disobedience can meet this 
standard.  The actions taken in obstructing the IRS office could hardly be 
said to have had a direct causal relation in abating the evils associated with 
American involvement in El Salvador.  Moreover, it should be noted that 
Aguilar did not require a direct causal nexus in its evaluation of the neces-
sity defense—but only required that the defendants show they “reasonably 
anticipated a causal relation between [their] conduct and the harm to be 
avoided.”163  Had Schoon permitted a looser construction of the notion of 
causation—as had clearly been advanced by Aguilar—the defendants 
would have had a better chance of getting their evidence to the jury. 
D. The Legal Way Out Factor 
Courts have frequently denied the necessity defense in civil disobedi-
ence cases on grounds that legal alternatives were available to the protes-
tors instead of violating the law, even if such efforts might well be futile.  
The U.S. Supreme Court gave a classic statement of this factor in holding 
that if there is “a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance 
both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm, 
  
Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982) (blocking entry to the Rocky Flats nuclear facility to change 
U.S. weapon policy); United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980) (trespassing on a naval 
installation to terminate the Trident submarine program); United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101 (4th 
Cir. 1979) (pouring blood and ashes on the Pentagon to change U.S. weapons policy); United States v. 
Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972) (burning selective service records to stop the Vietnam War); 
State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973) (trespassing at a Honeywell Corporation office to stop the 
Vietnam War). 
 159. 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 160. Id. at 195. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 163. Id. at 693. 
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the [necessity] defense will fail.”164  Lower courts have seized upon this 
language as an automatic ground for excluding the defense in civil disobe-
dience cases.165 
The courts have consistently said that activists are free to participate in 
the political process, distribute literature, make speeches, petition legisla-
tors, express their disagreement with government policy in electronic and 
print media, and so on.166  For example, “[t]here are thousands of opportu-
nities for the propagation of the anti-nuclear message: in the nation’s elec-
toral process; by speech on public streets, in parks, in auditoriums, in 
churches and lecture halls; and by the release of information to the media, 
to name only a few.”167 
Sometimes courts will simply refer to the notion that the defendants 
had “legal alternatives,” but usually courts hold that this factor requires a 
showing that there were no reasonable legal alternatives.168  Courts have 
been unsympathetic to the argument that legal processes to redress griev-
ances are inadequate or ineffective.169  The general attitude of courts in 
such cases is something like the following: You still had legal alternatives 
available; you could have continued to petition public officials to mitigate 
the harm with which you are concerned and engaged in other lawful politi-
cal activity to induce a change in law or policy; you could have instituted 
litigation against the relevant political agency in an effort to show that the 
agency is violating international law or violating its own regulations, and 
have sought adjudication of your concerns in that manner. 
In State v. Diener,170 the court said that the defendant failed to show 
the absence of legal alternatives which would have been effective in abat-
ing the danger of nuclear power.  On this point, the court noted that the 
defendant had access to electronic and print media as a means of express-
ing his disagreement with government policy and to help influence public 
  
 164. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (internal quotations omitted). 
 165. See, e.g., United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding the defendant’s conten-
tion, that he had no reasonable alternative to entering military property to engage in a prayer meeting to 
protest nuclear weapons, to be “impossible”).  
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 472, 432 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Brodhead, 
714 F. Supp. 593, 597 (D. Mass. 1989); Commonwealth v. Hood, 452 N.E.2d 188, 196 (Mass. 1983); 
State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 167. Quilty, 741 F.2d at 1033. 
 168. See, e.g., id. 
 169. See, e.g., United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 1982); Brodhead, 714 F. 
Supp. at 597.  In Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982), protesters were 
charged with trespass for occupying a restricted area of a nuclear power plant, and presented strong 
evidence of an actual radiation leak at the plant.  Nonetheless, the court rejected the necessity defense 
because defendants had not attempted to abate the hazard by initiating court actions on behalf of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission or its state counterpart.  Id. at 462–63. 
 170. 706 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
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opinion.171  The New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote that those “who 
oppose nuclear power have other lawful means of protesting nuclear 
power,” so that they are not able to argue a need to trespass.172 
However, from the perspective of civil disobedients, while “reason-
able” legal alternatives indeed exist, they will not be effective in abating 
the evil in question, particularly in light of the imminence of the threat, 
which, from the perspective of the protestors, casts a special urgency on 
the need for change.  Protestors may well believe that legal and time-
honored democratic processes may simply be useless under the circum-
stances.  “Activists frequently have spent years engaged in legal, but un-
successful, efforts to avert the dangers they perceive before turning—often 
reluctantly—to civil disobedience.”173 
John Rawls addressed the concept of legal alternatives, saying that at a 
certain point, further attempts to engage in legal processes may be fruitless 
because reasonable appeals “have already been made in good faith and . . . 
they have failed.”174  He elaborates that in some instances the evil to be 
abated may be so imminent that the duty to engage in legal efforts may 
cease to apply: 
Note that it has not been said, however, that legal means have been 
exhausted. . . .  [F]ree speech is always possible.  But if past ac-
tions have shown the majority immovable or apathetic, further at-
tempts may reasonably be thought fruitless, and a second condition 
for justified civil disobedience is met.  This condition is, however, 
a presumption.  Some cases may be so extreme that there may be 
no duty to use first only legal means of political opposition. . . .  
[E]ven civil disobedience might be much too mild, the majority 
having already convicted itself of wantonly unjust and . . . hostile 
aims.175 
From the standpoint of protesters who have strong beliefs, the danger 
of nuclear accidents or other perils is so grave that it is disingenuous to 
suggest that legal alternatives such as seeking redress with political offi-
cials, publishing arguments in the electronic or print media, or obtaining a 
civil injunction in court, are reasonable. 
Some courts take a restrictive view in the way they interpret the legal 
way out factor.  In United States v. Schoon,176 the court said that it was 
  
 171. Id. at 585. 
 172. State v. Dorsey, 395 A.2d 855, 857 (N.H. 1978). 
 173. Lambek, supra note 7, at 482–83. 
 174. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 373. 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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implying a reasonableness standard in judging whether legal alternatives 
exist but added that “[w]here the targeted harm is the existence of a law or 
policy, our precedents counsel that this reasonableness requirement is met 
simply by the possibility of congressional action.”177  The court held that 
with respect to indirect civil disobedience, “legal alternatives will never be 
deemed exhausted when the harm can be mitigated by congressional ac-
tion. . . .  Because congressional action can always mitigate this ‘harm,’ 
[i.e., the policy sought to be mitigated by protestors] lawful political activ-
ity to spur such action will always be a legal alternative.”178  The court 
added that “the ‘possibility’ that Congress will change its mind is sufficient 
in the context of the democratic process to make lawful political action a 
reasonable alternative to indirect civil disobedience.”179  The legal alterna-
tive of appealing to Congress is “reasonable” even though lobbying Con-
gress might be “futile,” and “regardless of the likelihood of the plea’s suc-
cess.”180  Accordingly, Schoon held that the necessity defense in such cases 
“should be subject to a per se rule of exclusion. . . .  Indirect protests of 
congressional policies can never meet all the requirements of the necessity 
doctrine.  Therefore, we hold the necessity defense is not available in such 
cases.”181 
Gray rejected the view that because a democracy creates legal avenues 
of protest, legal alternatives must always exist.182  This is in sharp contrast 
to Schoon, which held that reasonable alternatives are always available in 
connection with indirect civil disobedience.183  Gray ridiculed that notion 
by saying: 
When courts rule as a matter of law that defendants always have a 
reasonable belief in other adequate alternatives, they are asserting 
that regardless of how diligent a party is in pursuing alternatives, 
no matter how much time has been spent in legitimate efforts to 
prevent the harm, no matter how ineffective previous measures 
have been to handle the emergency, the courts in hindsight can al-
ways find just one more alternative that a citizen could have tried 
before acting out of necessity.184 
  
 177. Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 179. Id. at 199. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 199–200; see also United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (construing 
legal way out factor to mean that the necessity defense must be denied as long as the protestors have 
some legal alternatives that might effect the desired changes). 
 182. People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 860 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
 183. Schoon, 971 F.2d at 199–200. 
 184. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 860–61. 
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The defendants had testified to a long history of attempts to prevent the 
harm they perceived.  They made numerous formal protests to officials in 
the Department of Transportation and to other elected officials, and organ-
ized concerted petitioning and leaf-letting campaigns, but they were unable 
to get the Department of Transportation to hold a public hearing on their 
concerns.  The court said that a history of futile attempts by others will 
meet the no-legal alternative requirement.  Here, the members of Transpor-
tation Alternatives were completely excluded from the decision-making 
process concerning the closing of a very important roadway for pedestrians 
and bicyclists.  Thus, the court held that it cannot be said as a matter of law 
that they did not reasonably believe their legal alternatives to be exhausted.  
The court found that the prosecution had failed to disprove any element of 
the necessity defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and acquitted the defen-
dants.185 
Some of these decisions have made an untenable interpretation to the 
idea of “reasonableness” in construing the legal way out factor.  It seems 
absurd to suggest that even if it is futile to lobby Congress, nonetheless the 
protestors have a reasonable legal alternative.  Yes, one can always lobby 
Congress.  There is always the possibility of congressional action, but the 
existence of “further” legal options does not imply that the options are rea-
sonable.  “Reasonable,” according to Black’s Law Dictionary, means: 
“Fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances.  According to rea-
son.”186  A reasonable alternative implies that it is more than available—
that it will be effective as well: 
Reasonable must mean more than available; it must imply ef-
fective.  Surely a jury can believe that there are situations in which 
constitutionally protected free speech has proved so ineffective in 
changing undesirable laws or policies that a reasonable social re-
former would feel compelled to resort to another strategy.  Thus, 
some civil disobedients can raise a question of fact as to whether 
reasonable legal alternatives exist. 
For example, antinuclear protestors can show that their previ-
ous political activities did not provoke an articulate response from 
the government, much less a policy change.  And they can explain 
why their particular technique, with its direct confrontation and 
symbolic effect, is more promising.  Sanctuary worker can show 
  
 185. Id. at 863. 
 186. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (7th ed. 1999). 
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that there is no other way to save refugees’ lives.  Such a showing 
should entitle the jury to hear evidence on this element.187 
In this regard, another commentator observed: 
Consider, for example, the case where defendants make a prima 
facie showing that they reasonably believed that history demon-
strates the futility of legal action.  Even if these defendants are be-
fore a judge who does not believe that a history of futile attempts 
constitutes a no-legal-alternative situation, due process entitles 
them to jury consideration of whether their belief in the futility of 
legal action was reasonable and whether this established a reason-
able belief that no legal alternative existed.188 
Thus, the more enlightened view, which some judges have taken, is to al-
low juries to decide whether the defendant had reasonable (that is, fair, 
proper, ordinary, usual, or appropriate) legal alternatives to the act of pro-
test that resulted in the criminal charges. 
E. The Preemption Factor 
The preemption factor is a significant hurdle in claiming that the civil 
disobedient was justified in violating the law based on necessity.  The de-
fense is not available where the subject matter of the protest has been spe-
cifically approved of or sanctioned by legislative or executive action.  In 
such a situation, courts will hold that the matter has been “preempted” be-
cause the legislature or executive has made a policy determination that 
protects the “evil” which protestors seek to avert.  The policies are simply 
not deemed to be “harms.”189  For instance, by sanctioning construction of 
a nuclear power plant, the legislature has debated the merits and evils of 
nuclear power and has made a value choice in favor of nuclear energy, so 
that the question of the “necessity” of violating laws in order to protest 
nuclear power has been preempted.190 
The preemption factor may seem harsh in the context of civil disobedi-
ence cases.  The mere fact that legislation exists in a particular area, such 
as nuclear power, or that the President has authorized a military engage-
ment that protestors seek to avert, does not mean that Congress or the 
President has weighed the competing harms and made a preemptive value 
  
 187. Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 2, at 1180. 
 188. Schulking, supra note 134, at 93. 
 189. See Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 1985). 
 190. See generally Arlene D. Boxerman, Commentary: The Use of the Necessity Defense by Abortion 
Clinic Protestors, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 677, 694 (1990). 
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choice.  In addition, even if such a determination had been made, new facts 
may emerge to show that the regulatory scheme has failed to such an ex-
tent that it needs to be reexamined.  Perhaps there are risks that Congress 
did not contemplate in drafting legislation, which the defendant’s civil 
disobedience is designed to spotlight.  Even if the President acts pursuant 
to legislation, the scope of what Congress has approved may be unclear, 
and some actions of the President, such as deploying armed forces and 
engaging in armed conflict, often are not conducted with express congres-
sional approval.  Moreover, oftentimes civil disobedients do not attack the 
legality of policies, but the morality of the policies. 
In State v. Warshow,191 the court said that “the State of Vermont and 
the [f]ederal government have given their imprimatur to the development 
and normal operation of nuclear energy and have established mechanisms 
for the regulation of nuclear power.”192  The court said that the implication 
is that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh its dangers, so that allowing 
the defendants to present the necessity defense would in effect permit the 
jury to redetermine questions of policy already decided by the legislative 
branches of the federal and state governments.193 
A dissenting judge said that there was no inference from the legislature 
that the necessity defense should be precluded in this situation.194  Accord-
ing to the dissent, the defendants offered to show an emergency that the 
regulatory scheme failed to avert, and were entitled to prove that their civil 
disobedience sought to avert a nuclear disaster that the regulatory scheme 
was designed to prevent.  Moreover, the regulatory scheme made it clear 
that the people, as individuals and through their local and state representa-
tives, have the right to evaluate the dangers of depositing, storing, or re-
processing high-level radioactive waste materials.195  The dissent also 
noted that the defendants had “offered to show by expert testimony that 
there were defects in the cooling system and other aspects of the power 
plant which they believed could and would result in a meltdown within 
seven seconds of failure on the start up of the plant,” which was relevant to 
the imminence requirement of the necessity defense.  Thus, the dissent 
would have allowed the issue to go to the jury. 
On the preemption factor, Berrigan noted that the activity of the Gen-
eral Electric plant in manufacturing bomb shell casings was lawful conduct 
  
 191. 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979). 
 192. Id. at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1004 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 1006. 
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so that there appears to be a legislative intention to preclude application of 
the necessity defense from this particular situation.196 
The doctrine of separation of powers is often tied to the preemption 
factor in civil disobedience cases.  This is alluded to above in our discus-
sion on the reluctance of judges to allow the necessity defense in civil dis-
obedience cases.  As mentioned, courts have frequently held that to allow 
the necessity defense as a means of political protest would be a transgres-
sion of the principle of separation of powers, since it would force the 
courts to choose to side with or differ with policies adopted by Congress, 
and would require a jury to consider the complex issues already deter-
mined by elected representatives.197  The idea is that by allowing the jury 
to hear the defense, this would impede democratic processes and could 
greatly frustrate policies that have been duly promulgated by the legislative 
and executive branches of government. 
V.  ABORTION PROTEST CASES 
A. How Anti-Abortion Civil Disobedience Differs from Other Types of 
Protest 
Anti-abortion activists have on numerous occasions attempted to raise 
the necessity defense in connection with criminal trespass charges arising 
out of abortion clinic demonstrations.198  Invariably, the defense has been 
rejected as a matter of law.199  Still, even in situations where the defense of 
necessity is denied, juries have in fact acquitted some protestors.200 
Abortion protest cases started to emerge after the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.201  These protesters sought to change 
government policy that permitted first trimester abortions.  The idea was 
that by trespassing at abortion clinics, they could bring public awareness to 
the immorality of abortions.  Often, too, the protesters had the immediate 
goal of preventing individual abortions, which they regard as murders.  
That is, abortion protestors believed that “abortion represents the inten-
tional taking of a human life, and preventing an abortion is thus seen by 
them as equivalent to preventing a murder.”202 
  
 196. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 230 (Pa. 1985). 
 197. State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 198. See generally Boxerman, supra note 190, at 677. 
 199. See id. at 678. 
 200. See id. at 678 n.10. 
 201. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 202. United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (N.D. Fla. 1994). 
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There are four main areas in which anti-abortion civil disobedience dif-
fers from other types of civil disobedience.  One distinction pertains to the 
choice of evils factor.  In abortion protest cases defendants seek to argue 
that the necessity defense is available although the activity is a legal human 
act.  The argument is that even if the abortion clinic is performing legal 
abortions, the protestors are nonetheless seeking to avert a moral harm and 
that the necessity defense ought to apply because criminal trespass is a 
lesser evil than the moral harm they wish to prevent. 
A second distinction pertains to the imminence of harm factor.  As-
suming that an abortion is something that causes a harm, then from the 
standpoint of anti-abortion activists, their illegal methods of protest are 
clearly directed at an imminent harm.  Under this reasoning, protestors will 
seek to provide evidence that “abortions were about to be performed by an 
abortion provider, and that injuring or interfering with the provider would 
avert the imminent peril of the abortion being performed.”203  This is dis-
tinguished from other forms of civil disobedience in which the defendant 
may be unable to present evidence that the harm sought to be averted was 
imminent. 
A third distinction is with respect to the causal nexus factor.  Defen-
dants in the abortion protest cases are able to provide evidence that their 
illegal methods of protest had a direct causal connection in at least prevent-
ing some abortions from taking place on the day of the protest.  Civil dis-
obedients in other contexts, as we have seen, have had great difficulty for 
the most part in presenting evidence that satisfies the causal nexus factor. 
A fourth distinction pertains to the preemption factor.  While this hur-
dle has been noted to a significant extent in other types of civil disobedi-
ence, it is an especially great hurdle in the context of abortion protests be-
cause obtaining a first trimester abortion remains a constitutionally pro-
tected right.  Almost every court which has considered the necessity de-
fense has rejected it when asserted in trespass-abortion cases, largely based 
on the preemption factor.204  Some courts have rejected the defense on the 
ground that since first trimester abortions are legally protected, there is the 
failure of the choice of evils factor in that “a public or private injury pre-
supposes the actionable invasion of some right, and no actionable invasion 
of a right occurs in a legally protected activity.”205  Other courts have been 
open to the possibility that a lawful abortion could be construed to be a 
harm, but that nonetheless the necessity defense must be disallowed in 
  
 203. Id. 
 204. See State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 205. Id. 
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trespass-abortion cases on the ground that the activity is constitutionally 
protected under Roe v. Wade. 
Let us examine with some specificity the main elements abortion pro-
testors have sought to advance under the necessity defense. 
B. Analysis of the Necessity Doctrine in Abortion Protest Cases 
1. Choice of Evils Factor 
Defendants in these cases have argued that their action was necessary 
to avoid the death of the fetuses and that the trespass was a lesser evil.  The 
courts generally have rejected the choice of evils factor in trespass-abortion 
protest cases on the grounds that the “injury” sought to be prevented is not 
a legally recognized injury because of the ruling in Roe v. Wade that the 
right to privacy guaranteed by the Constitution encompasses a woman’s 
decision to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester.206  Thus, 
protestors have consistently been denied the necessity defense on the 
ground that they did not in fact face a valid choice of evils when the abor-
tion provider and patient are seeking to abort a first trimester abortion.207 
For example, Commonwealth v. Markum208 involved protestors who 
were charged with trespass for forcibly pushing their way into an abortion 
clinic and destroying aspirator machines and other medical instruments.209  
The court said: “Appellants cannot use unlawful means in an effort to stop 
lawful behavior, no matter how morally reprehensible they feel that behav-
ior to be.”210  The court noted, in construing Pennsylvania’s necessity stat-
ute, that a constitutionally sanctioned activity such as abortion could not be 
considered a “public disaster” within the meaning of the statute.211  This 
and similar cases suggest that legal human conduct (e.g., doctors providing 
and women seeking first trimester abortions) cannot ever constitute a 
“harm to be avoided” under the necessity doctrine. 
In Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage,212 the Alaska Supreme 
Court affirmed the conviction of abortion protesters at a clinic in Anchor-
age, Alaska.  The court said that there are commentators who have “ex-
panded” the necessity defense to encompass human threats, but that “we 
  
 206. See, e.g., People v. Krizka, 416 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Sigma Reproductive Health 
Center v. State, 467 A.2d 483 (Md. 1983); City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982); Commonwealth v. Markum, 541 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 207. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Alaska 1981). 
 208. 541 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 209. Id. at 348. 
 210. Id. at 351. 
 211. Id. at 350. 
 212. 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981). 
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are in agreement with those commentators who have noted that it should be 
limited to cases in which the threatened man-made harm is illegal.”213  The 
court also interpreted the necessity doctrine to mean that the necessitous 
circumstances must generally be a result of physical forces of nature.214  
The court quoted one commentator as follows: 
[W]henever the harm emanates from a human source, this harm 
must be unlawful before the necessity defense can be used.  This 
assumption, although not explicit in the cases or statutes, is solidly 
based in the common law as developed in both older and more re-
cent cases.  The early cases did not face the question as they dealt 
only with harms caused by natural forces, which can never be ille-
gal.  When faced with cases involving human-created harms, the 
courts modified the necessity doctrine and required that the threat-
ened harm be illegal.  This requirement continued in the prison es-
cape cases.  Although these decisions held necessity to be a proper 
plea when the threatened harm emanated from a human source, the 
facts of the cases involved human-created threats of unlawful acts, 
usually rape, homicide or felonious assault.  Recent codifications 
and judicial opinions discuss the necessity defense in broad terms, 
neither expressly designating the source of the threatened harm nor 
its character.  They are meant to codify the common law and can 
fairly be assumed to embody common-law principles.  Several 
states’ inclusions of self-defense and defense of another, which 
both justify otherwise unlawful conduct in the face of another per-
son’s unlawful act, support this thesis.215 
Thus, the court held that the necessity defense does not apply in this case 
because “the alleged harm sought to be avoided did not arise from a natural 
source and was not unlawful.”216 
The view that the necessity defense is not properly asserted if the harm 
to be averted is a product of lawful human conduct appears to be flawed 
and has been challenged.217  For example, in City of Chicago v. Mayer,218  
  
 213. Id. at 1079 n.10. 
 214. Id. at 1078. 
 215. Id. at 1079 n.10 (citing Debbe A. Levin, Note, Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of Criminal 
Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 513 (1979)). 
 216. Id. at 1079. 
 217. See, e.g., Patrick G. Senftle, Note, The Necessity Defense in Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases, 32 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 523, 527 (1987) (noting the view that the harm the actor seeks to avoid need not flow 
from unlawful activity, but may include lawful human-created harms); see also United States v. Hill, 
893 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (N.D. Fla. 1994); PAUL H. ROBISON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSE § 124, at 48 
(1984). 
 218. 308 N.E.2d 601 (Ill. 1974). 
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the defendant successfully interposed the necessity defense for disorderly 
conduct and interfering with police officers in the performance of their 
lawful duties.  Although the action of making a lawful arrest was a human 
action and lawful, the defendant reasonably believed, albeit incorrectly, 
that the police were endangering the life of the arrestee, and on that basis 
interfered with the arrest and was acquitted based on the necessity de-
fense.219 
It is also worthwhile to note that numerous necessity statutes provide a 
broad characterization of the defense, and do not limit the threats of harm 
which justify someone in violating the law.  Many of the statutes simply 
use generic terms such as “harm” or “evil,” without defining those terms. 
The view that the necessity defense is unavailable if the activity to be 
averted is a legal human act would have counterintuitive consequences.  
For instance, take the case of someone who violates the traffic laws in or-
der to speed someone who has gotten into an accident to the hospital.  The 
harm to be avoided—death or aggravation of bodily injuries—may well 
have been caused by lawful human acts, such as by falling down acciden-
tally.  If the necessity defense demands that the human-created harm be 
illegal, the driver might not have a defense to charges of speeding and 
reckless driving because the human-created harm is legal.  We might con-
sider, again, the example of Glanville Williams, regarding the dike that 
gave way.  Presumably, the evil to be averted was an act of God, not some-
thing that was human-created, yet intuitively the necessity defense should 
be available to the actor who diverts the dike. 
The question of whether legal abortions can constitute a “harm to be 
avoided” under the necessity doctrine was addressed in People v. 
Archer.220  The defendants were charged with criminal trespass and resist-
ing arrest at a “sit-in” at a hospital to prevent performance of abortions that 
the actors claimed were beyond the first trimester.  At trial the group con-
tended that it had resisted being removed from the abortion wing because 
they intended to “rescue” the unborn children whom the medical group had 
scheduled for abortions that morning.221 
The court said that what constitutes an “injury to be avoided” un-
der New York’s necessity statute encompasses more than simply 
what is criminally illegal.  Behavior that is permissively legal may 
nonetheless constitute an “injury to be avoided” under ordinary 
standards of intelligence and morality.222  The language of the stat-
  
 219. Id. at 604. 
 220. 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. City Ct. 1988). 
 221. Id. at 728. 
 222. Id. at 731. 
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ute broadly refers to the injury to be avoided as that “which is of 
such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence 
and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury 
clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to 
be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.”223 
The court said: 
In Nevada, for example, prostitution is legal, but still, immoral.  
Some type of gambling is almost everywhere legal, but many per-
sons of ordinary intelligence and morality still consider it immoral.  
Traffic in alcoholic beverages is legal, but its byproduct, drunken-
ness, remains immoral.  Divorce is legal, but in many cases, it is 
immoral, especially when it affects innocent children of the mar-
riage.  Thus, the two ideas—morality and legality—are not the 
same.  Morality is the standard of conduct to which, as good and 
decent people, we all aspire.  Legality is the standard of conduct to 
which, as members of a civilized society, and under penalty of the 
criminal sanction, we must all adhere.224 
Although first trimester abortions are generally legal, still abortion can 
constitute a moral “injury to be avoided” under New York’s necessity stat-
ute “because citizens of ordinary intelligence and morality remain free both 
as individuals and as jurors, to find [that abortions are injuries to be 
avoided] notwithstanding the fact that the [l]egislature has made most 
abortions ‘justifiable’ in relation to what would otherwise be a prohibited 
criminal act.”225  The court further held that the jury could find that “the 
urgency of avoiding such injuries clearly outweighs the desirability of 
avoiding injuries such as Trespassing and Resisting Arrest.”226  The court 
said: 
The jury may weigh the loss of the life of the developing fetus 
against the property rights the trespass statute protects, and the so-
cial order values the arrest statute supports.  And if the jury finds 
that the value of these fetal lives clearly outweighs the competing 
values of private property and social order, then . . . they may ac-
quit the defendants.227 
  
 223. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (2006). 
 224. Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 731 (footnote omitted). 
 225. Id. at 732. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 732–33. 
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The judge then seemed to contradict his entire line of reasoning by 
saying that the jury could not consider the necessity defense with respect to 
first trimester abortions since that would interfere with a constitutionally 
protected area of privacy mandated by Roe v. Wade.228  However, the court 
said that the necessity defense may be applicable if the defendants could 
prove they were protesting because the obstetrical group was about to per-
form abortions outside of the first trimester.  In the end, the jury found that 
the abortions scheduled on the day of the defendant’s protest were all first 
trimester, and the defendants were found guilty of trespass and resisting 
arrest.229 
Also in connection with the choice of evils factor, courts have argued 
the “slippery slope” as a policy consideration if abortion protestors could 
justify trespass or other illegal acts based on necessity.  “To accept appel-
lant’s argument would be tantamount to judicially sanctioning vigilantism.  
If every person were to act upon his or her personal beliefs in this manner, 
and we were to sanction the act, the result would be utter chaos.”230  An-
other court echoed this view by saying: 
If abortion trespassers are given license to disrupt the activities of 
abortion clinics and refuse to desist upon being requested to vacate 
the premises . . . the continuing battle between those who abhor 
abortion and those that believe it is a private moral decision could 
well be joined in physical confrontations into which the police and 
the courts would be rendered unable to intervene. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he enduring clashes of beliefs in this fractious dispute 
must be resolved not by physical confrontations at the front line, 
but rather through the legislative and judicial framework created 
for the very purpose of undertaking the sometimes formidable 
tasks of choosing between extreme positions and competing val-
ues.231 
Some courts have said that the trespass was the greater evil, that it 
caused greater harm to the patients and the abortion clinic: “The Clinic’s 
schedule was disrupted and its operating room required resterilization; and 
it was certainly foreseeable that the patients scheduled to undergo abor-
tions at the time the demonstration occurred would suffer emotional dis-
  
 228. Id. at 734. 
 229. Id. at 735. 
 230. Commonwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d 1325, 1329 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1988). 
 231. People v. Crowley, 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 151–52 (N.Y. J. Ct. 1989). 
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tress as a result of appellants’ invasion of their privacy during a particu-
larly sensitive period.”232 
A final aspect of choice of evils involves abortion clinic bombings and 
killings.  Courts have rejected the use of deadly force as justification under 
the necessity doctrine to protect unborn fetuses from abortion.233  In United 
States v. Hill,234 the court rejected necessity as a defense to the murder of a 
doctor who performed abortions.235  The case involved Paul Hill, who in 
1994 ambushed a doctor, his unarmed bodyguard, and the doctor’s wife, in 
Pensacola, Florida, killing the doctor and his bodyguard.  He was found 
guilty of murder and sentenced to death.236 
2. The Imminence of Harm Factor 
The harm that abortion protestors seek to avert is, in most cases, quite 
concrete, imminent, and much less speculative and remote than the harms 
sought to be avoided in other civil disobedience cases.  Anti-abortion pro-
testors seek to prevent abortions scheduled on the day of their trespass by 
blocking access to the clinics.  These protesters often can prove that abor-
tions were scheduled to be performed at a particular clinic on the very day 
of their demonstrations.237  In other words, the harm that these protesters 
seek to avert is not “a theoretical future [event] . . . that may or may not 
occur.”238  With abortion protest cases the harm sought to be avoided, 
namely abortions, is not temporarily remote—as in cases where protesters 
trespass at nuclear power plants or weapon manufacturing plants.  Abor-
tion protestors point out that they seek to prevent abortions scheduled to be 
performed perhaps within moments of the time that they occupied and 
blocked the premises. 
In Cyr v. State,239 protestors sought to defend charges of trespass at an 
abortion clinic on the grounds that they reasonably believed that there was 
imminent danger that the clinic was going to perform illegal late-term 
abortions.240  One witness testified that she had seen a woman in the clinic 
whom she believed to be at least seven or eight months pregnant, but the 
  
 232. Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Alaska 1981). 
 233. See generally Charles E. Rice & John P. Tuskey, The Legality and Morality of Using Deadly 
Force to Protect Unborn Children From Abortionists, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 83, 101 (1995). 
 234. 893 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Fla. l994). 
 235. Id. at 1048. 
 236. See Activist Guilty of Clinic Murder, PITTSBURGH-POST GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1994, at A5. 
 237. See, e.g., People v. Krizka, 416 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 
S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
 238. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980) (concerning political protest at a 
Trident submarine base). 
 239. 887 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 240. Id. at 204–05. 
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court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that these beliefs 
were reasonable.  Hence, the court held that since the defendants’ belief 
that there was imminent danger that third trimester (i.e., unlawful) abor-
tions were going to be performed was unreasonable, they had failed to sat-
isfy the imminence of harm factor under the necessity doctrine.241 
3. The Causal Nexus Factor 
Abortion protesters argue that they can establish a causal connection 
between their acts and the harm they wish to avert.  That is, by blocking 
access to the clinic, at least for the time being, protesters can hope to post-
pone some abortions or force some women to go to other clinics.242  They 
thereby abate the harm of abortion, albeit only temporarily.  And they may 
also interact with women and try to dissuade them from having an abor-
tion. 
The acts of trespass-abortion protest appear to have a much more plau-
sible causal nexus in averting the harm in question compared to other cate-
gories of civil disobedience, such as nuclear power plant protests.  Those 
desiring abortions will not be able to have them, at least not that day; they 
will be forced to postpone the planned abortion and, perhaps in the inter-
val, be persuaded by the abortion protesters to change their minds. 
Some courts have been sympathetic to the causal efficacy factor in 
these cases, with one court reasoning that: 
While protestors of nuclear weapons cannot “hold a reasonable be-
lief that a direct consequence of their actions [will] be nuclear dis-
armament,” it is possible to hold a reasonable belief that injuring 
or interfering with abortion providers will prevent at least one or 
some abortions from occurring.  The fact that the number of medi-
cal doctors willing to perform abortions continues to decline 
makes the causal connection stronger.  One doctor may provide 
services for many clinics in several states: injuring or interfering 
with such a doctor could effectively eliminate services for a large 
number of patients for a period of weeks or months.  Therefore, for 
  
 241. Id. at 206–07. 
 242. See Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Alaska 1981) (“[T]heir 
actions could not halt the alleged greater harm to which society had given its imprimatur, but rather 
that, at best, the harm could be only postponed for a brief interval, following which society’s normal 
operations would reassert themselves.”); Commonwealth v. Markum, 541 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1988) (“Appellants’ occupation of the Women’s Center did not stop its operation.  Legal abortions 
continued to be performed in the Center and were available in other medical facilities throughout 
Pennsylvania.”); Commonwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d 1325, 1329 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1988) (“There is no 
evidence that any women discontinued their efforts to obtain an abortion as the result of appellant’s 
actions.”). 
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purposes of the necessity defense analysis, a causal connection 
may exist here that is lacking in the case of nuclear protestors.243 
Moreover, in recent times the political climate concerning abortions seems 
to have shifted: 
Since its defeats in the November elections, nothing has put the 
fractured soul of the Democratic Party on display more vividly 
than abortion.  Party leaders, including Senator Hilary Rodham 
Clinton of New York and the new chairman, Howard Dean, have 
repeatedly signaled an effort to recalibrate the party’s thinking 
about new restrictions on abortion.244 
4. The Legal Way Out Factor 
Abortion protesters, like other political activists, have legal alternatives 
for airing their political views and seeking policy changes.  Courts have 
generally stated that abortion clinic protestors can exercise their First 
Amendment rights by providing information regarding abortions to persons 
entering clinics, except insofar as the activity might violate the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994,245 which we discuss below. 
Abortion protestors may speak to individuals approaching the clinics, 
hand out literature on public property, peacefully carry picket signs on 
public property in front of abortion clinics, pray on public property, engage 
in advertising on billboards or in other media, canvass door to door, and 
lobby for legislative reforms in the area of abortion.246 
On the other hand, 
[i]n the case of abortion, the efficacy of legal alternatives could ar-
guably be questioned as to the likelihood of their success.  As a 
general proposition, evidence that a defendant exhausted all avail-
able legal alternatives, and that such alternatives as a class had 
been futile over a long period, might be sufficient to allow a de-
fendant to present his necessity defense to the jury.247 
To abortion protestors, there are no reasonable legal alternatives because 
the right to obtain first trimester abortions appears to be firmly enshrined in 
  
 243. United States v. Hill (Hill I), 893 F. Supp. 1044, 1046–47 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (citation omitted). 
 244. David D. Kirkpatrick, For Democrats, Rethinking Abortion Position Meets With Mix of Reac-
tions in Party, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A18. 
 245. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). 
 246. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Markum, 541 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“There are 
obviously numerous means in a democratic society to express a point of view or to attempt to prevent a 
perceived harm without resorting to criminal behavior.”). 
 247. Hill I, 893 F. Supp. at 1047–48. 
File: Cohan - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on:  8/20/2007 2:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/5/2007 9:58:00 AM 
156 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 1 
 
American jurisprudence and will remain so unless reconsidered by the Su-
preme Court or an amendment to the Constitution is passed.  This leads 
some to conclude that: “Those attempting to exhaust legal alternatives in 
the anti-abortion field thus have few methods at their disposal.”248  And as 
some courts have observed, “[i]f the identified alternatives are illusionary, 
then there may well be no legal alternative.”249  Abortion protestors may 
well be able to show that they “had actually tried the alternative or had no 
time to try it, or that a history of futile attempts revealed the illusionary 
benefit of the alternative.”250 
5. The Preemption Factor 
Under the preemption analysis, it appears that abortion clinic protesters 
are precluded from raising the necessity defense because the Supreme 
Court held, in Roe v. Wade, that a woman’s right to a first trimester abor-
tion is protected by the Constitution.  “Admittedly, it would be unreason-
able to assert that today’s society has uniformly embraced the Roe Court’s 
value choice.  Nonetheless, the constitutional protection afforded abortion 
has the legal effect of a declaration of society’s values concerning abortion, 
which precludes the use of the necessity defense by abortion clinic protest-
ers.”251  In other words, first trimester abortion is not a “harm” but has been 
granted affirmative status as a legally protected interest, and this expresses 
a value choice which preempts the use of the necessity defense in abortion 
protest cases. 
A separate preemption hurdle is the Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act of 1994,252 which says that whoever: 
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intention-
ally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, in-
timidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has 
been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or 
any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive 
health services shall be subject to a fine or imprisonment according 
to the penalty provisions of the statute.253 
  
 248. Id. at 1050. 
 249. Id. at 1047. 
 250. United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 251. See Boxerman, supra note 190, at 700. 
 252. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006). 
 253. Id. § 248(a)(1). 
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The statute also makes it unlawful to intentionally damage or destroy the 
property of a facility that provides reproductive health services.254 
The statute prohibits conduct, not speech.  According to the Act’s rules 
of construction, nothing in it “shall be construed . . . to prohibit any expres-
sive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstra-
tion) protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution . . . .”255  However, it has been held that uttering warnings or 
threats to physicians through a bullhorn constitutes “intimidation” in viola-
tion of the Act,256 and that making telephone threats to kill a person provid-
ing reproductive health care services constitutes terroristic threats in viola-
tion of the Act.257  On the other hand, it was held that a priest who made 
statements on a nationally televised talk show that killing of abortion pro-
viders was justified if motivated by the desire to protect innocent human 
life, did not use a “threat of force” against a physician who performed 
abortions and who also appeared on the show.258  In order for acts of “in-
timidation” to constitute a violation of the Act, the conduct must place a 
person in “reasonable apprehension” of bodily harm to himself or her-
self.259 
The constitutionality of the Act has been upheld in numerous cases, in-
cluding Terry v. Reno.260  The Act clearly precludes protestors from invok-
ing the necessity defense with respect to acts that seek to prevent individu-
als from obtaining abortions.  The sweeping language of the Act would 
seem to extend its anti-intimidation prohibition even in situations where 
people might be seeking abortions beyond the first trimester.  Whether the 
Act might pertain to protests over illegal abortions has not yet been deter-
mined. 
VI.  VIET NAM ANTI-WAR PROTEST CASES 
A significant body of case law on civil disobedience involved anti-war 
protests over the Viet Nam War.  In many of these cases, anti-war protes-
tors charged with the destruction of Selective Service records, sought, but 
failed, to get the necessity defense before the jury.261  In some of these 
  
 254. Id. § 248(a)(3). 
 255. Id. § 248(d)(1).  
 256. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).  
 257. See Greenhut v. Hand, 996 F. Supp. 372 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 258. See Lucero v. Trosch, 928 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
 259. See United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
 260. 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1264 (1997). 
 261. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Glick, 463 F.2d 
491 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Turchick, 
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cases, the defendants claimed they were destroying property to save lives, 
and that at any rate the symbolic destruction of property was justified as a 
protest against an illegal war.262  Some of these defendants spoke of obey-
ing a higher moral law or their conscience.263  However, most of the cases 
held that the sincere belief that the protestors were breaking the law for a 
good cause was not acceptable as a legal defense or justification.  In one 
case, the court stated that “[i]t implies no disparagement of their idealism 
to say that society will not tolerate the means they chose to register their 
opposition to the war.”264 
On December 24, 1970, John Simpson entered the Local Board of the 
Selective Service System in San Jose, California, opened a file drawer, 
doused the contents with gasoline, and set the files ablaze.  He remained in 
the building and was arrested.  He was subsequently indicted and convicted 
of destroying government property and interfering with the Selective Ser-
vice System.  He sought to introduce evidence that his actions were done to 
avert greater evil in the war zone.  The trial judge rejected the proffered 
evidence and refused to give the jury instructions regarding the defense of 
necessity. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction,265 and its decision seems to 
emphasize the failure of the defendant to show a causal nexus between the 
acts of protest and the evil sought to be averted.  The court said that it rec-
ognized the “theoretical basis of the justification defense[] . . . that, in 
many instances, society benefits when one acts to prevent another from 
intentionally or negligently causing injury to people or property.”266  How-
ever, the court said that “[a]n essential element in the so-called [necessity] 
defense is that a direct causal relationship be reasonably anticipated to 
exist between the defender’s action and the avoidance of harm.”267  The 
court said that it was unreasonable for Simpson to believe that his actions 
might have a significant effect on the evils he wished to prevent because 
the war would undoubtedly continue whether or not the San Jose draft 
board continued to function.268 
As noted above, there are good arguments to reject a strict construction 
of the causal nexus factor in civil disobedience cases because, in many 
  
451 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Beneke, 449 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1969). 
 262. See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 57, at 300. 
 263. See id. 
 264. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969). 
 265. See United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 266. Id. at 518. 
 267. Id. at 518 (emphasis added). 
 268. Id. at 518 n.7.  
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instances, the results may be indirect, subtle, and may not manifest after a 
period of years. 
In a similar Viet Nam era case, United States v. Baranski,269 four de-
fendants poured blood on Selective Service records.  They argued that they 
reasonably believed their conduct was necessary to save those persons reg-
istered in the files they destroyed from imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily injury and from being compelled to commit war crimes in an illegal 
war.270  The trial judge accepted a small portion of the proffered evidence 
that draftees were in imminent danger of death in Viet Nam, that draftees 
were compelled to commit war crimes in Viet Nam, and that the war was 
illegal under international law. The defendants tendered a necessity de-
fense instruction for the jury, but the judge rejected it.  Nonetheless, the 
jury acquitted the defendants of three substantive charges (the same 
charges as in Simpson), but guilty of conspiracy.  On appeal, the conspir-
acy count was reversed on other grounds.271 
In United States v. Kroncke,272 the defendant sought to justify the steal-
ing of draft cards on the ground that interfering with the Selective Service 
would shorten the war in Viet Nam and thus save endangered human lives.  
The court of appeals rejected the defense, largely on the grounds that the 
imminence factor was not satisfied.  The judges reasoned that the necessity 
defense applies only if the action was undertaken to avoid a “direct and 
immediate peril.”273 
Other cases involved protests over the production of Napalm and other 
controversial chemicals deployed in the war zone.  In United States v. 
Dougherty,274 the defendants broke into the Washington offices of Dow 
Chemical Company to protest Dow’s production of Napalm.  They threw 
papers and documents about the office and into the street below, vandal-
ized office furniture and equipment, and defaced the premises by spilling a 
bloodlike substance.  The defendants were convicted of malicious destruc-
tion of property.  The judge refused to instruct the jury that “moral com-
pulsion” or “choice of the lesser evil” constituted a legal defense.275  In 
refusing to instruct the jury on the necessity defense, the judge quoted to 
the jury the following language from a Supreme Court case: 
The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an 
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty 
  
 269. 484 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 270. See id. 
 271. Id. at 571. 
 272. 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 273. Id. at 701. 
 274. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 275. Id. at 1121. 
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itself would be lost. . . .  We also reaffirm the repeated decisions of 
this Court that there is no place for violence in a democratic soci-
ety dedicated to liberty under law, and that the right of peaceful 
protest does not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to ex-
press may do so at any time and at any place.  There is a proper 
time and place for even the most peaceful protest and a plain duty 
and responsibility on the part of all citizens to obey all valid laws 
and regulations.276 
The judge went on to tell the jury: 
Individuals who believe that the Vietnam War is illegal or im-
moral or that certain activities of the Dow Company are undesir-
able have the right under our system of government to express 
their views or to protest these events by any lawful means, such as 
by peaceful picketing or parading.  But the Constitution of the 
United States does not protect as a form of symbolic speech the 
destruction of private property and the violation of valid laws de-
signed to protect society. 
The defendants may have been motivated by the highest moral 
principles, and they may have been sincerely and passionately in-
spired.  But such motives do not confer immunity from prosecu-
tion or conviction for the violation of a valid law, and as such the 
motives of the defendants are not controlling in the case which is 
before you for decision.277 
The judge also refused to provide a “jury nullification” instruction re-
quested by the defense to the effect that the jury had the right to disregard 
the law as he gave it to them.  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit said that to in-
struct the jurors on the availability of jury nullification would run the risk 
of anarchy.278  The court said that it would be unwise for a judge to ex-
pressly delineate to the jury its “charter to carve out its own rules of 
law.”279  It added: 
Moreover, to compel a juror involuntarily assigned to jury duty to 
assume the burdens of mini-legislator or judge, as is implicit in the 
doctrine of nullification, is to put untoward strains on the jury sys-
tem.  It is one thing for a juror to know that the law condemns, but 
he has a factual power of lenity.  To tell him expressly of a nullifi-
  
 276. Id. at 1137 n.54 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 574 (1965)). 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. at 1134. 
 279. Id.  
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cation prerogative, however, is to inform him, in effect, that it is he 
who fashions the rule that condemns.  That is an overwhelming re-
sponsibility, an extreme burden for the jurors’ psyche.280 
In United States v. Moylan,281 the Fourth Circuit expressed similar views 
against providing specific instructions to the jury on jury nullification: 
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to 
which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves 
as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos.  No legal 
system could long survive if it gave every individual the option of 
disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard 
was judged morally untenable.  Toleration of such conduct would 
not be democratic, as appellants claim, but inevitably anarchic.282 
VII.  ANIMAL WELFARE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
Civil disobedience is not always non-violent or limited to the simple 
acts of trespass or malicious mischief.  Mahatma Gandhi actually endorsed 
violence in connection with civil disobedience: “I do believe that where 
there is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise vio-
lence.”283  And Jesus engaged in riotous civil disobedience when he threw 
out the moneychangers in the Temple.284 
Many ordinary citizens are sympathetic to the animal liberation 
movement, which has the philosophy that animals have certain fundamen-
tal rights, parallel to those of humans, and that we, as moral agents, have a 
duty to advocate and insure that these rights are defended.  Peter Singer’s 
Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals,285 and 
other works, helped spawn the philosophical imperative that animals, like 
humans, possess certain fundamental and inalienable rights, and therefore 
should be treated as equals.  Many who advocate an animal rights agenda 
believe that the use of animals in research and industry is analogous to 
slavery and the Holocaust. 
Most animal rights advocacy groups do not openly condone the use of 
violence or other unlawful means to further their agenda.  Many animal 
welfare societies work within established legal channels to ensure that 
  
 280. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1136. 
 281. 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969). 
 282. Id. at 1009. 
 283. ZINN, supra note 1, at 42 (quoting Gandhi). 
 284. See Matthew 21:12. 
 285. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHIC FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (1972). 
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laboratory and other animals are treated humanely.  They confine their 
efforts to lobbying government and other public institutions, launching 
demonstrations and protests, and sponsoring public education cam-
paigns.286 
However, in recent years the use of violence and other disruptive ex-
pressions of extremism on behalf of animal rights have been rapidly ex-
panding.287  Environmental activists have also been known to engage in 
what is termed eco-terrorism.288  Fueling the radical animal liberation 
movement are such publications as A Declaration of War: Killing People 
to Save Animals and the Environment, a “call to arms” treatise that encour-
ages violence and sabotage against animal enterprises and individuals such 
as research scientists.289  Since the early 1980s, a broad range of enter-
prises, in both public and private sectors, that use or market animals in 
their commercial or professional activities, have been targeted by radical 
elements within the animal rights movement with acts of disruption, vio-
lence, intimidation, arson, supergluing of locks, death threats, letter bombs, 
car bombs, computer hacking, burglary in order to liberate animals, and the 
destruction of equipment involved in animal experimentation.290 
For example, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is a militant, under-
ground group dedicated to the liberation of all animals from “exploitation” 
by humans.291  The ALF seeks to justify various illegal acts based on the 
necessity of saving animals in factory farms and laboratories from abuse.  
The ALF has used the slogan: “[I]f we are trespassing, so were the soldiers 
who broke down the gates of Hitler’s death camps; if we are thieves, so 
were the members of the underground railroad who freed the slaves of the 
South; and if we are vandals, so were those who destroyed forever the gas 
chambers of Buchanwald and Auschwitz.”292  The ALF and similar organi-
  
 286. See Report to Congress on the Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism in 
Animal Enterprises, 36 THE PHYSIOLOGIST 207, 207 (Dec. 1993), available at http://www.the-
aps.org/publications/tphys/legacy/1993/issue6/207.pdf [hereinafter Report to Congress]. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See Denise R. Case, The USA Patriot Act: Adding Bite to the Fight Against Animal Rights Ter-
rorism?, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 187, 208 (2002).  For instance, an act of eco-terrorism reported in a 1998 
hearing in Congress involved equipment sabotage in the logging industry.  See id.; see also People v. 
Bauer, 614 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1994); People v. Crowley, 538 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1989).  Placing spikes in trees 
and in paths through the woods and burning down animal testing centers have become common tactics 
by various environment protection activists.  Earth Now, for instance, a militant environmental group in 
the United States, has argued that if necessary, they would be justified in killing people to save trees. 
 289. Report to Congress, supra note 286, at 250. 
 290. See Rachel Monaghan, Terrorism in the Name of Animal Rights, in THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM 
160–161 (Max Taylor & John Horgan eds., 2000). 
 291. See Report to Congress, supra note 286, at 248–49. 
 292. Garrett O’Boyle, Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four Groups, 
in 14 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 23, 28 (2002) (quoting Animal Liberation Front). 
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zations have garnered considerable public sympathy despite their acts of 
violence and destruction.293 
In 2004, the ALF, armed with axes and bolt cutters, vandalized the of-
fices and trucks of a major concrete supplier in connection with construc-
tion of an animal research laboratory at Oxford University.294  Activists 
from this group have been known to track down employees of pharmaceu-
tical companies and threaten them, or gather outside their homes or offices 
to angrily protest against the use of animals for scientific research and test-
ing.295  They sent out a forged letter to shareholders of the company that 
was building the laboratory, supposedly from the company’s chairman, 
telling them to sell their shares.  The company’s stock price plummeted, 
and the company soon withdrew from the project.296  These illegal tactics 
produced a major victory for activists.  Earlier in the year, “after months of 
pressure, intimidation and protests from the groups, Cambridge University 
abandoned plans to build a major primate research center.”297  Investors 
and drug manufacturers, on the other hand, have warned that Britain, 
which is a dominant force in the pharmaceutical industry, could face a se-
rious erosion of biomedical investment if the violence and intimidation 
does not stop.298 
Many of these acts constitute direct civil disobedience because they are 
violating the specific laws and rights of others that they believe are funda-
mentally wrong.  Thus, it would seem that they would have a stronger case 
of asserting the necessity defense, under the Schoon ruling, than most other 
civil disobedients. 
Congress sought both to punish those who engage in acts of “terror-
ism” against animal enterprises and to deter others from doing the same.  
The Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992299 (AEPA) makes it a fed-
eral offense, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment for up to one year, to 
cause physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise result-
ing in economic damage exceeding $10,000.  The AEPA also imposes 
sentences of up to ten years or life imprisonment, respectively, in persons 
causing the serious bodily injury or death of another during the course of 
such an offense. 
The AEPA defines “animal enterprise” as 
  
 293. See Report to Congress, supra note 286, at 249. 
 294. See Lizette Alvarez, Animal Welfare Advocates Win Victories in Britain with Violence and 
Intimidation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, at A6. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. The Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006). 
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(A) a commercial or academic enterprise that uses or sells animals 
or animal products for profit, food or fiber production, agriculture, 
education, research, or testing; 
(B) a zoo, aquarium, animal shelter, pet store, breeder, furrier, cir-
cus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive animal event; or 
(C) any fair or similar event intended to advance agricultural arts 
and sciences.300 
In addition, over half the states have a criminal statute pertaining to animal 
enterprise terrorism.301 
There apparently has been only one prosecution under the AEPA, in-
volving a group of defendants associated with an organization known as 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty in Britain.  The organization objects to 
the use of dogs, primates, and rats by a company called Huntingdon Life 
Sciences, and the group also undertakes protests against other firms as 
well.  The group posted what it called the “top twenty terror tactics” to be 
used against companies and individuals, including: invading offices, chain-
ing gates shut, writing graffiti on cars and houses, flooding houses with 
garden hoses, smashing windows, and sending defective e-mail messages 
in attempts to disrupt computers.302  One of the defendant’s lawyers said, 
“[a]ny activity he engaged in was lawful and was within his First Amend-
ment rights.”303  On its Web site, the group likens itself to the Underground 
Railroad and the Boston Tea Party.  The group has been successful in caus-
ing substantial economic damage to Huntingdon.  Numerous companies 
severed their ties with the lab, including Aetna and March insurance com-
panies, Goldman Sachs, and the Bank of America.304 
The group and the organization itself were indicted in 2004 in New 
Jersey, where Huntingdon has a facility.305  The defendants were accused 
of disrupting the New Jersey facilities of Huntingdon and threatened its 
employees and others who do business with the firm.  After a jury trial, the 
organization and six of its members, including its president, were found 
guilty of violating the AEPA.306  The organization was convicted on evi-
dence that it used its Web site to incite threats, harassment, and vandal-
  
 300. Id. § 43(d)(1)(A)–(C). 
 301. Case, supra note 288, at 200. 
 302. THE BRITISH TERROR INVASION, http://www.mitosyfraudes.org/Polit/Terror.html (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2007) (quoting from the magazine, The Scientist). 
 303. Robert Hanley, Seven Animal Rights Advocates Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at B9. 
 304. See David Kocieniewski, Six Animal Rights Advocates Are Convicted of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2006, at B3. 
 305. Hanley, supra note 303. 
 306. Kocieniewski, supra note 304. 
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ism.307  This was the first instance of a conviction under the AEPA.308  The 
defendants apparently did not seek the necessity defense, but argued that 
their acts and communications were protected by the First Amendment.309 
There are numerous hurdles in asserting the necessity defense in a case 
involving violence in connection with animal rights advocacy.  For one 
thing there is the choice of evils factor.  Many believe that testing animals 
with proposed pharmaceuticals is the only way to determine the safety of 
new products, and this paves the way to eventual use by human subjects.  
The use of animals in such contexts ends up saving human lives, and thus 
on balance it would seem that the choice of evils weighs against seeking to 
avert such experiments.  And various federal and state laws have been en-
acted to ensure humane treatment of animals in such situations.310 
Another hurdle is the legal way out factor.  It appears that lawful cam-
paigns such as boycotts and less extreme forms of civil disobedience are 
available and have produced results.  For instance, in 1989, People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) engaged in protests at Procter & 
Gamble’s headquarters, throwing cream pies at the company’s chairman, 
and sponsoring a race car to spoof the company’s “Tide” car.311  Eventu-
ally, Procter & Gamble announced “it will immediately stop using animals 
to test many of its household products.”312  The change prompted the com-
pany to spend nearly $100 million to develop alternatives to animal test-
ing.313 
In another incident, PETA informed the Washington D.C. Dining So-
ciety, prior to a scheduled banquet where foie gras would be served, of the 
cruelty involved in obtaining foie gras from geese and ducks, and as a re-
sult the event’s organizer removed the item from the banquet menu.314 
These are examples in which nonviolent tactics can work to change 
policies concerning animal welfare.  Also, raising public consciousness 
through education and boycotts is “more likely to garner respect from the 
general public (toward the animal rights movement) than accidentally kill-
ing someone in a laboratory firebomb.”315  On the other hand, activists may 
believe that peaceful methods such as boycotts and lobbying are not rea-
sonable legal alternatives because they take a significant amount of time to 
become causally effective, during which many animals will die. 
  
 307. Id. 
 308. See id. 
 309. See id. 
 310. See Case, supra note 288, at 191–92. 
 311. Id. at 229. 
 312. Id. at 229–30. 
 313. Id. at 230. 
 314. Id. at 230 n.255. 
 315. Id. at 230 n.252. 
File: Cohan - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on:  8/20/2007 2:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/5/2007 9:58:00 AM 
166 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 1 
 
A final hurdle is the preemption factor, evidenced by the intention of 
Congress to make unlawful the very acts of civil disobedience that the 
group in the above AEPA case engaged in. 
VIII.  CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DEFENSE BASED ON THE NUREMBERG 
PRINCIPLES 
Some civil disobedients have interjected a separate and novel defense 
that is similar to, but analytically distinct from, the necessity defense.  
These protesters have sought to use the Nuremberg Principles as a defense, 
and in some cases have been successful. 
The Allied Powers codified the Nuremberg Principles as international 
law at the end of World War II.  On August 8, 1946, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain signed an Agreement for the Es-
tablishment of an International Military Tribunal, known as the London 
Charter, to try persons charged with war crimes.316  The London Charter 
sets forth definitions for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.317  To civil disobedients, article 6 of the London Charter is 
of particular interest in that it holds individuals personally responsible for, 
among other things, “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war . . 
. in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances.”318  Under 
the London Charter, it is not a defense to individual responsibility that an 
individual acted under superior orders.319  The notion of individual respon-
sibility, which forms the core of the Nuremberg Principles, applies not 
only to government officials, policy makers, and military personnel, but to 
  
 316. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (known as the 
London Charter). 
 317. Id. art. 6(a)–(c). 
 318. Id. art. 6(a).  Article 6 defines war crimes as: 
[M]urder, ill-treatment or deportation to [slave] labor, or for any other purpose the civilian 
population of or in an occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or per-
sons on the scene, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruc-
tion of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
Id. art. 6(b).  Crimes against humanity are defined as: 
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during war; or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpe-
trated . . . . 
Id. art.6(c). 
 319. See id. art. 8. 
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private citizens as well.320  Individual responsibility depends “on the extent 
of complicity as reflected in actions and knowledge.”321 
The strategy to civil disobedients is to argue that their actions were de-
signed to prevent others from violating the law embodied in the Nurem-
berg Principles.  It has been persuasively asserted that the application of 
the Nuremberg Principles in domestic courts is entirely proper, and that 
indeed courts have a duty to apply them.322  The Nuremberg Principles 
became customary international law at the moment they were announced, 
or within a very short time thereafter.323  As such, customary international 
  
 320. See The Zykon B Case, reprinted in THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1487 (L. 
Friedman ed., 1972) (in which civilians were charged with providing Zykon B (prussic acid) used to 
kill prisoners in concentration camps).  “[T]he provisions of the laws and customs of war are addressed 
not only to combatants and to members of state and other public authorities, but to anybody who is in a 
position to assist their violation.”  Id. 
 321. Richard A. Falk, The Nuremberg Defense in the Pentagon Papers Case, 13 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 208, 231 (1974). 
 322. See, e.g., Frank Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 397, 404–13 (1989). 
 323. According to one commentator, one of the objectives of the Nuremberg Trials was to lay down 
the rule of individual accountability: 
Henceforth, no matter how exalted your position, whether you were captains, kings, presi-
dents, prime ministers, secretaries of parties, heads of parlor bureaus, military chieftains, 
bankers, industrialists, no matter how exalted, Justice Jackson [American Chief of Counsel 
of the Nuremberg Trials] said, “We will give you short shrift, a long rope, and into your 
hands, we will pass the poisoned chalice.”  In other words, if war comes . . . [n]o longer 
does exalted status confer immunity.  
Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Recalling the War Crimes Trials of World War II, 149 MIL. L. REV. 15, 16–17 
(1995).  According to another commentator:  
In neither the Tokyo nor the Nuremberg Trials was it sufficient for the defence [sic] to show 
that the acts of responsible officers or of government ministers and officials were protected 
as “acts of state.”  The twin principles of individual criminal responsibility and of universal 
jurisdiction in the prosecution and punishment of war criminals were firmly established. 
R. John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its Contemporary Reso-
nances, 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 33 (1995).  Yet another commentator had this to say:   
Nuremberg was a historical landmark in other respects as well.  It marked the start of the in-
ternational human rights movement because it was the first international adjudication of 
human rights.  Its effect in this respect is felt throughout the world in the United Nations 
Genocide Convention, the United Nations Universal Bill of Rights, American Convention 
on Human Rights, and above all, the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms. 
Henry T. King, Jr., The Nuremberg Context from the Eyes of a Participant, 149 MIL. L. REV. 37, 46 
(1995).  A further comment reveals the following: 
The judges at Nuremberg were concerned that the proceedings be seen as the enforcement 
of legal norms, not simply a process of the victors punishing the vanquished. . . .  The de-
fendants argued that the old legal system protected them against punishment, an argument 
that had proven effective in the war crimes trials held at the end of World War I.  Although 
that argument may seem nonsensical to us today, it was not a trivial argument in its time. . . 
.  We need not reexamine that claim today.  But we should be cautious against assuming that 
what is true today has always been true.  The decision at Nuremberg built on and confirmed 
the growing changes in international law, but it represented a turning point for individual re-
sponsibility and for international law. . . .  The rejection of the “superior orders” defense is 
of necessity based on the presumption of an applicable legal order outside of and beyond the 
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law “is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”324  Custom-
ary international law is not foreign law, but is part of U.S. constitutional 
and federal law.325 
The strategy for civil disobedients is to assert that they acted to prevent 
the commission of international crimes.  Suppose a group of people are 
arrested for criminal trespass while protesting the production of weapons at 
a defense contractor’s facility.  The individuals will seek to argue that the 
basis of their protest is that the weapons being produced are for deploy-
ment by the government to quell civilian uprisings in, say, Country X, and 
to foment an illegal coup against the existing regime.  The defendants will 
argue that the defense contractor and the government are conspiring to 
accomplish this, and this conspiracy is a violation of the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples. 
The defendants will then seek to assert that they acted “to prevent the 
commission of a crime about to be committed, or to prevent the consum-
mation of a crime already underway. . . .”326  They will seek to justify the 
action based on the common law privilege of using reasonable force to 
prevent a crime that is being committed or is about to be committed in their 
presence.  This privilege to use force to prevent the commission of a crime 
is summarized as follows: “One who reasonably believes that a felony, or a 
misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace, is being committed, or is 
about to be committed, in his presence may use reasonable force to termi-
nate or prevent it.”327  Perkins and Boyce articulate the privilege this way: 
“[A]ny unoffending person may intervene for the purpose of preventing the 
commission or consummation of any crime if he does so without resorting 
to measures which are excessive under all the facts of the particular 
case.”328  Most jurisdictions in the United States recognize this privilege to 
use force to prevent crime.329  This defense, sometimes referred to as the 
  
nation state.  This, in itself is the most important sign of transformation of the paradigm that 
was being made. 
Fred L. Morrison, The Significance of Nuremberg for Modern International Law, 149 MIL. L. REV. 
207, 212 (1995). 
 324. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 325. Lawrence, supra note 322, at 407. 
 326. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 513 (3d ed. 2000); see also Lawrence, supra note 322, at 
407 n.36. 
 327. LAFAVE, supra note 326, at 513–14; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 693–94 (West 2004). 
 328. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1108 (3d ed. 1982). 
 329. See LAFAVE, supra note 326, at 513 n.36; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 197 (privilege to take 
human life), 692–94 (crime prevention privilege generally) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 704.1–
704.9 (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.00–35.25 (McKinney 2004). 
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“citizen’s privilege,”330 requires only that the defendants have a “reason-
able belief that an ongoing or imminent violation of . . . law is occur-
ring.”331  Thus, if the defendants are reasonable in their belief, but mis-
taken, the defense may still be asserted.332 
Numerous courts have simply said that the defendants lacked standing 
to raise the Nuremberg Principles as a basis of their defense.333  The doc-
trine of standing is based on constitutional and prudential considerations.  
The constitutional issue stems from the “case or controversy” requirement 
of Article III of the Constitution.  The Supreme Court has considered the 
question of a plaintiff’s standing to sue in a variety of cases.334  For exam-
ple, the Court has said that simply being a citizen interested in having the 
government act within the bounds of the Constitution generally does not 
afford a party standing to challenge governmental actions.  Chief Justice 
Burger stated: 
[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest . . . which 
is held in common by all members of the public, because of the 
necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share.  Con-
crete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable 
element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form tradi-
tionally capable of judicial resolution. . . .  This personal stake is 
what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant au-
thoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the 
[case]. . . .  Only concrete injury presents the factual context within 
which a court, aided by parties who argue within the context, is 
capable of making decisions.335 
In United States v. May,336 which involved demonstrators who were 
accused of trespass in climbing a fence and entering a naval submarine 
base to protest the use of the Trident system, a submarine-based nuclear 
  
 330. See Lawrence, supra note 322, at 416. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See id. 
 333. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lowe, 
654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968); 
see also Lawrence, supra note 322, at 422–24. 
 334. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 
(1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Simon v. Eastern 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); O’Shea 
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
 335. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220–21. 
 336. 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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missile system, the Ninth Circuit addressed the standing issue in refusing 
to allow the Nuremberg defense, stating: 
The connection between what the defendants did and their claims 
that the Trident system is designed solely for the waging of ag-
gressive war, and is therefore illegal, is so tenuous as not to give 
them any basis for asserting the defense.  They can assert no harm 
to themselves from the allegedly illegal conduct of the government 
that is greater than, or different from, the potential harm that might 
affect every other person in the United States.337 
Another ground for rejecting the Nuremberg Principles defense is that 
the political question doctrine forecloses the court from entertaining the 
defense.338  Numerous courts have been reluctant to allow the defense be-
cause it would require an adjudication of the legality of U.S. foreign pol-
icy.339  There is also reluctance to allow the defense because it would sig-
nal that private citizens have the right to take the law into their own 
hands.340 
Nonetheless, some courts have allowed civil disobedients to introduce 
evidence, based on the Nuremberg Principles defense, that a given foreign 
policy is illegal, and the results have been acquittals or dismissals of ac-
tions.  The most notable case of this kind was Massachusetts v. Carter,341 
which involved Amy Carter (former President Jimmy Carter’s daughter), 
Abbie Hoffman, and thirteen others.  The protestors targeted recruitment 
by the Central Intelligence Agency on the University of Massachusetts–
Amherst campus.  The protestors were charged with trespassing and disor-
derly conduct in their demonstration against the CIA.  The defendants ar-
gued the necessity defense in addition to the citizen’s privilege, based on 
their reasonable belief that the Nuremberg Principles were being violated.  
They asserted that the executive branch of the United States was violating 
international law through the actions of the CIA, and that the defendants 
had acted to prevent the CIA from committing further crimes.342  Among 
other things in this line of argument, they asserted that the CIA was con-
ducting a secret foreign policy which was designed to systematically mur-
der, mutilate, and torture civilian populations and to destabilize govern-
ments in El Salvador, Chile, the Congo, Indonesia, and Viet Nam.343 
  
 337. Id. at 1009. 
 338. See Lawrence, supra note 322, at 417–22. 
 339. See, e.g., Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. at 342–43, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970). 
 340. See Lawrence, supra note 322, at 421. 
 341. Mass. v. Carter, No. 8745-JC-0091A (D. Ct., Hampshire County, Mass., Apr. 15, 1987); see 
also Rick Hornung, ‘Necessity’: Is It the Mother of Acquittals?, NAT’L L.J., May 4, 1987, at 6. 
 342. Id. at 32. 
 343. Lawrence, supra note 322, at 434 n.252. 
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The court allowed the jury to consider these arguments.  The defen-
dants had expert witnesses who described to the jury assassinations, mur-
ders, campaigns of misinformation, and other alleged activities by the CIA 
in Nicaragua.  Some witnesses testified that other means of protest, such as 
seeking action in Congress, were futile.  The jury acquitted all the defen-
dants.344 
City of Richland v. Barnes345 involved twenty-nine people who were 
charged with disorderly conduct for blocking the road leading to the Han-
ford Nuclear Reservation in Washington State.  In addition to the necessity 
defense, the defendants argued the citizen’s privilege with regard to their 
belief that international law was being violated by the activities at the facil-
ity.  In a previous case, the Benton County District Court Commissioner 
had made favorable rulings on the admissibility of these defenses.346  How-
ever, before the defendants had the opportunity to present their defense, the 
charges were dismissed by another judge based on his ruling that the disor-
derly conduct ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.347 
In Vermont v. McCann,348 the defendant was charged with disorderly 
conduct with respect to a protest over weapons production at the General 
Electric plant in Burlington, Vermont.  In addition to the necessity defense, 
the defendant argued that the air-to-ground cannon being manufactured 
was used in attacks against civilians as part of a strategy of deterring civil-
ian support for the overthrow of the government of El Salvador.  The de-
fendant argued that he acted to protect the lives of Salvadoran citizens 
threatened by the guns produced inside the plant, in violation of the Nur-
emberg Principles. 
The court allowed this to go to the jury, on the grounds that the U.S. 
government had consistently demanded that domestic courts apply interna-
tional law.  The court said: 
The United States has applied treaty and customary interna-
tional law with little hesitation when it was deemed appropriate to 
bring others to justice. 
. . .  This Court is not prepared to hold that our law is that of 
the hypocrite nor is it that of the vengeful conqueror. 
  
 344. See Matthew L. Wald, Amy Carter Is Acquitted over Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1987, at 
A17. 
 345. City of Richland v. Barnes, No. 38323 (D. Wash. Oct. 31, 1986). 
 346. Lawrence, supra note 322, at 435. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Vt. v. McCann, No. 2857-7-86 (D. Vt. Jan. 26, 1987), reprinted in 44 GUILD PRAC. 101 (1987). 
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Therefore, this Court holds that international law including 
specifically, the Nuremberg Principles, is law appropriate to be 
administered by this Court or any other court of justice.349 
The court also discussed the political question doctrine, saying that an is-
sue is not transformed into a political question merely because it involves 
matters of social policy or public interest.350  The court said that the Nur-
emberg Principles defense involves issues of foreign policy, but that the 
defendant “offers to prove that a particular foreign policy is illegal, not that 
it is unwise or even foolish.  That is an issue appropriate for the judiciary.  
Were it otherwise, the executive would be above the law; it is not, even in 
matters of national security.”351  The defendant was acquitted. 
In Vermont v. Keller,352 the citizen’s privilege was again asserted by 
protesters who were charged with criminal trespass at the offices of Sena-
tor Robert T. Stafford.  They had hoped to persuade him to hold a public 
meeting concerning U.S. policy in Central America.  At trial, they argued 
that the U.S. government had aided and abetted the government of El Sal-
vador in the commission of international crimes, that the U.S. policy with 
respect to Nicaragua violated international law, and that the defendants had 
a citizen’s privilege to take appropriate action to prevent the continued 
violation of international crimes.  After hearing the defense based on the 
Nuremberg Principles, the jury acquitted the defendants. 
In Chicago v. Streeter,353 eight demonstrators were charged with tres-
pass in connection with a protest at the Chicago office of the South African 
Consulate.  The court allowed the jury to hear evidence that the actions of 
the defendants were necessary to prevent violations of international law 
under the Nuremberg Principles.  The accused argued that the government 
of South Africa had been committing crimes by its policies of racial segre-
gation and that the defendants acted reasonably in their efforts to prevent 
the continuation of these crimes.  All defendants were acquitted. 
Similarly, in Illinois v. Jarka,354 protestors charged with mob action 
and resisting arrest at a demonstration at the Great Lakes Naval Base pre-
sented a necessity defense that their action was designed to prevent viola-
tions of the Nuremberg Principles.  The court allowed the defendants to 
present evidence concerning illegal U.S. actions in Nicaragua.  The jury 
acquitted all defendants. 
  
 349. Id. at 14–15, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 108. 
 350. Id. at 17, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 109–10. 
 351. Id. at 19, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 110 (citation omitted). 
 352. Vt. v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84 (D. Vt., filed Nov. 13, 1984). 
 353. Chi. v. Streeter, No. 85-108644 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. May 17, 1985). 
 354. Ill. v. Jarka, No. 002170 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Apr. 15, 1985), reprinted in 42 GUILD PRAC. 108–10 
(1985). 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
A. Arguments in Favor of the Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience 
Cases 
One may wonder, in considering the vast array of federal and state 
cases on the subject, whether the tendency to refuse juror access to evi-
dence of the necessity defense is seriously misguided, and whether social 
justice, dissent, and individual freedom might be better served by tilting 
the scales in the opposite direction so that juries may have the opportunity 
to decide such questions in more cases. 
The necessity defense allows the airing of views by those in most need 
of a hearing, i.e., individuals who are most frustrated by the workings of 
the political system.  To them, there is no reasonable legal alternative 
available in the orthodox political structure to give them a voice in shaping 
government policy.  Airing these issues in the courtroom sends a message 
to legislators and other officials by bringing the challenged law or policy to 
their attention.  In addition, the jury is empowered to weigh controversial 
political issues.  Traditionally, juries had the power to decide questions of 
law as well as fact.355  Allowing a jury to consider the necessity defense 
simply underscores that traditional role. 
The defendants in such cases admit committing the crime but hope that 
the jury, as “conscience of the community,” will apply community stan-
dards of fairness.  “Reflected in the jury’s decision is a judgment of 
whether, under all the circumstances of the event and in light of all known 
about the defendant, the prohibited act, if committed, deserves condemna-
tion by the law.”356 
The necessity defense in the context of civil disobedience cases allows 
a much needed infusion of individual expression and grassroots 
political activity.  The defense promotes a more vibrant and em-
powered political culture by amplifying individual viewpoints, by 
empowering a cross section of the community (the jury), and by 
increasing the quantity and quality of public discourse.  Even con-
sidering the arguments against the political necessity defense, one 
might find these ends alluring enough to permit its use.357 
  
 355. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 284–85 (1974); Alan W. Scheflin, Jury 
Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 176 (1972). 
 356. See Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 985–86 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting); see 
also United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (jury’s 
role in resolving moral issues should be made explicit in jury instructions). 
 357. Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 2, at 1184. 
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One way that the necessity defense might be made more available in 
civil disobedience cases is to relax the requirement of imminence of harm.  
Civil disobedients would prefer that the imminence requirement be inter-
preted to mean that the danger is something “inevitable,” but not necessar-
ily a threat immediately at hand.  Of course, if courts construe the immi-
nence factor, as some have, to require evidence showing merely that the 
threat is inevitable rather than temporally near at hand, there is the further 
hurdle concerning the legal way out factor.  For if there is ample time to 
pursue legal courses of action in an effort to avert the policy being tar-
geted, the protestors may be denied the necessity defense.  In this respect, 
the more enlightened approach taken by some courts is that futile or un-
availing legal options do not equate with reasonable legal alternatives. 
Another component that could be relaxed is the causal nexus factor.  
Some courts have been accommodating in requiring only a showing that 
the defendants had a reasonable belief that their conduct would be in some 
way effective in changing the contested policy, and the reality is that there 
are many examples in which policy changes occurred in response to civil 
disobedience, not immediately, but after a period of time.358 
The public is often unaware of certain government policies and prac-
tices.  By permitting the necessity defense when defendants have a reason-
able claim to it, society may benefit from a full airing of the political or 
social issues at hand.  This could serve to bring public attention to impor-
tant and controversial issues both inside and outside the courtroom.  It 
could also serve as a check on low-level bureaucratic decisions of which 
the public would otherwise be unaware. 
B. Arguments Against the Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases 
There are serious drawbacks to allowing the necessity defense in civil 
disobedience cases.  A main worry of judges is that political protesters try 
“to extend the necessity doctrine beyond its strict and logical limits, and to 
transform it into a principle that results in legalizing criminal activity in the 
pursuit of political ends.”359 
In addition, allowing the necessity defense in effect transfers political 
questions into the judicial arena, and thus interferes with the doctrine of 
separation of powers.  Allowing a jury to decide whether civil disobedi-
ence is justified in effect rejects the legislative process altogether, and al-
lows the jury to become a mini-legislator by ruling on the policy itself. 
  
 358. See Lambek, supra note 7, at 481. 
 359. Wilson v. State, 777 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tex. App. 1989).   
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For a jury to endorse illegal acts on the basis of political necessity 
undermines majority rule, implicates the separation of powers doc-
trine, and disrupts principles of equal justice.  Testimony and in-
structions on political necessity promote jury nullification by pro-
viding the jury with a handy framework to negate duly enacted 
laws.360 
Moreover, typical jurors are qualified as finders of fact, but may not 
be qualified to act as policy formulators.  Thus, there is the concern that 
juries will make ad hoc policy determinations.  “To allow nuclear power 
plants to be considered a danger or harm within the meaning of that de-
fense . . . would require lay jurors to determine in individual cases matters 
of State and national policy in a very technical field.”361  On the other 
hand, juries who are allowed to consider the necessity defense may be 
aided by the introduction of expert testimony on the policy questions under 
consideration. 
One final objection is that civil disobedients, like other citizens, have 
the opportunity to be heard before regulatory agencies and the courts, and 
they also have the right to lobby the legislature.  If people could make out a 
case of necessity just because they failed in effecting legislative or execu-
tive changes, democratic processes would be eroded. 
  
 360. Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 2, at 1195. 
 361. State v. Dorsey, 395 A.2d 855, 857 (N.H. 1978). 
